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9Introduction: Dolphin
INTRODUCTION
TONY DOLPHIN 
IPPR
The industrial structure of European economies and the types of 
occupation that they support are changing. This change takes many 
forms in different national contexts, but there are some common 
themes. There has been an increase in service-sector employment, both 
in low-skilled customer service work and in high-skilled ‘knowledge’ 
occupations, and a corresponding drop in manufacturing employment. 
This has contributed to a ‘polarisation’ of the workforce in many 
countries, with more high-skill and low-skill jobs but fewer requiring 
mid-level skills. At the same time, young people are finding it increasingly 
hard to get a foothold in the labour market, and the proportion of the 
workforce employed on full-time, permanent contracts has shrunk.
Some of the changes are cyclical, the result of recession followed 
by a stuttering recovery. The rise in temporary work, for example, 
might be expected to recede when European economies are again 
growing strongly enough to bring unemployment down towards its 
pre-recession level. Other changes, however, are the result of major 
structural forces operating in the global economy: the rapid pace of 
technological innovation, globalisation and demographic change. 
These forces are likely to continue to cause dislocation and disruption 
in European labour markets for the foreseeable future. As a result, 
there will be a fundamental shift in the types of jobs that are available 
for workers and in the skills demanded by employers across Europe.
At the end of 2014 there were over 24 million people unemployed in 
the EU28 countries – one in 10 of the potential workforce (Eurostat A). 
This represents a massive waste of resources. Understanding the 
likely changes in the European labour market over the next decade 
is essential if policymakers and firms are to set Europe onto a path 
towards permanently lower unemployment through the creation of 
many more well-paid jobs.
The purpose of this collection of essays is to highlight the most likely 
trends in employment across Europe over the next 10 years, and 
to find out how experts think policymakers, firms and individuals 
should respond. The first set of essays examines the changing nature 
of Europe’s labour market; the authors in this section analyse how 
globalisation and technological change in particular are likely to affect 
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the demand for skills over the next decade. The second set of essays 
looks to Germany for lessons that can be taken from its past reforms. 
The third section focusses on the likely effects of technological 
change, which it is generally agreed is driving the biggest changes 
in labour markets, and on the most appropriate policy responses. 
Then, in a final essay, we present the results of a survey of over 2,500 
companies across five European countries, which provide some 
interesting findings on the skills employees are using, polarisation on 
a sectoral level, and how firms are responding by increasing or cutting 
staff numbers.
The changing shape of Europe’s labour market
Putting aside the effects of the recession, there have been two 
main drivers of change in Europe’s labour markets in recent years: 
globalisation and technological innovation. Neither is new: there have 
been previous waves of globalisation, most particularly in the late 19th 
century, and technological innovation has been a constant feature – 
albeit at varying paces – since the beginning of the industrial revolution. 
But the pace of both in recent years is widely seen as exceptional.
This is indisputable in the case of globalisation. In the space of 
less than 20 years, over 1 billion people have been added to what 
might be termed the ‘global market economy’. This has created 
opportunities, and many firms have succeeded in selling into the new 
markets that have been opened up in China and elsewhere. But it 
has also created threats. Low-paid workers have undercut workers 
in developed economies, and there has been a major transfer of 
production to emerging economies, with a consequent reduction in 
the demand for relatively low-skilled workers in developed economies.
It may be, however, that the biggest effects of this wave of 
globalisation are in the past. Wage levels have increased in the 
emerging world, making it less profitable to transfer production there, 
and there is some evidence of ‘reshoring’ – firms bring production 
back to developed economies. However, this development might 
not always be to the benefit of those low-skilled workers who lost 
their jobs when production was moved to emerging economies. One 
impetus for reshoring is that technological innovation now means 
production requires fewer low-skilled workers to be on hand.
There is more of a debate – mainly being conducted in the United 
States – about the pace of technological innovation and its effects 
on the economy. On one side are those who argue that we are in the 
middle of a massive leap in technology that will boost productivity 
levels across a wide range of industries and create a new golden age 
of prosperity. On the other are those who think that technological 
progress is slowing down and that recent developments – because 
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they are mainly in the areas of communication – have little impact on 
productivity and potential economic growth rates.
For the most part, the contributors to this collection believe 
globalisation or technological innovation – or more likely both – will 
continue to have a profound impact on the European labour market. 
Terence Hogarth and Rob Wilson, from the Institute for Employment 
Research at Warwick University, summarise the likely effect of these 
trends. Globalisation will mean Europe loses more low-skilled jobs, 
with a risk that mid-skills jobs are also affected. Technological 
innovation will also mean less demand for mid-skilled workers and 
more demand for workers with high-level skills that complement 
the new technologies. Overall, this is likely to produce a skewed 
polarisation of the workforce: fewer mid-skilled jobs, lots more high-
skilled jobs, and less change in the number of low-skilled jobs.
Jonathan Wadsworth, of Royal Holloway, University of London, points 
out that these trends are likely to be associated with a continued shift 
of people into the non-traded service sectors and, if we want to see 
living standards increase, the challenge will be to raise productivity 
levels and real wages in these sectors. The importance of future 
productivity growth is also highlighted by Andries de Jong and Mark 
ter Veer, of PBL, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 
who produce four scenarios for future developments in the European 
labour market and show how, as a result of the ageing of the 
European population, even in the most optimistic scenarios real GDP 
per capita will only increase if there is a surge in productivity.
In their essays, Matthew Whittaker from the Resolution Foundation 
and Peter Glover and Hannah Hope from the UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills look beyond the high-level trends to analyse 
potential changes in the nature of working life and conditions. 
Whittaker thinks it is possible that we will see a continuation of recent 
trends towards increased self-employment and use of non-standard 
employee contracts, including temporary working. Glover predicts 
big changes in the way that companies are organised, with less focus 
on developing internal capabilities among their own workforces and 
more on bringing together capabilities from a number of different 
sources, such as consultants and freelancers, in a ‘virtual workplace’. 
The associated flexibility of employment relationships, he believes, 
will place the onus on individuals to acquire the skills they need to 
prosper. As a result of these changes, the labour market of 2025 or 
2030 will look very different to that of today. Some of the effects will 
be positive, but others highlight the importance of tackling low pay 
and poor worker rights.
A more circumspect tone is adopted by Michael J Handel, of 
Northeastern University in Boston. While acknowledging the various 
ways in which technological change can affect the labour market, he 
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points out the many measurement problems that arise when trying to 
assess skills demand, supply and mismatch. In particular, he thinks it 
is important not to generalise from well-publicised cases of dramatic 
change to the labour market as a whole. Instead, he says, long-run 
data suggests that change has happened and continues to happen at 
a gradual pace.
Overall, the message from these essays is that the European labour 
market is likely to see substantial disruption and change over the 
next 10 to 15 years, and that it will be less stable and secure for 
workers. There will be increased polarisation in the demand for skills 
from employers and a continued shift from manufacturing to services. 
The likelihood is that aggregate employment will increase, but there 
is a risk that a combination of labour-saving automation and a poor 
response by firms, individuals and policymakers could lead to falls in 
employment and sustained very high levels of unemployment.
Lessons from Germany
In part 2 of this collection, Werner Eichhorst of IZA and Michael Fischer 
and Jörg Bergstermann of Freidrich Ebert Stiftung look to Germany 
– the country in Europe where the labour market, at least in terms 
of unemployment, has been least impacted by recent financial and 
economic turmoil. Eichhorst recounts the experience of labour market 
reform in Germany as a case study to show how a country can adapt 
to the changing shape of its labour market, but can also bring about 
change through its own actions. He highlights how sometimes change 
does not turn out as expected: for example, efforts to encourage 
temporary working as a bridge into permanent employment appear 
to have led to the creation of pockets of temporary working that have 
become a permanent feature of the German labour market. 
Fischer and Bergstermann pick up this theme of unintended 
consequences, and suggest that Germany’s reforms have resulted, at 
the margin, in companies adopting a ‘low road’ strategy of low-value-
added, low-paid jobs. They argue that, given low unemployment 
levels, Germany now needs to focus on improving job quality and 
reducing the numbers of people in precarious unemployment. At the 
same time, stronger mechanisms need to be put in place to buffer all 
workers, not just ‘core workers’ from the worst effects of temporary 
fluctuations in demand.
David Brady, Thomas Biegert and Sigurt Vitols from WZB use data 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel to place recent changes 
in the German labour market into a longer context. They find some 
evidence to support the views of Fischer and Bergstermann: the 
reforms have led to an increase in precarious work, and the downside 
to increased labour market flexibility has been an increase in part-
time work, low-wage employment and wage inequality. But their 
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strongest finding is a growing ‘dualisation’ of the German labour 
market between ‘insiders’ – who are more likely to be older, male and 
native – and ‘outsiders’ – who are more likely to be young, female and 
migrants. Insiders enjoy the benefits of full-time, permanent jobs with 
good wages, benefits and protections. Outsiders are more likely to 
be working part-time and earning low wages. They note that this has 
happened despite an increase in the average skill level of the German 
workforce and argue that the lesson for Germany and for the rest 
of Europe is that supplying skills to a flexible labour market is not a 
sufficient response to change. More needs to be done to support and 
encourage firms to use these enhanced skills.
The effects of technological progress on jobs
The authors of the essays in part 3 all share a view that technological 
innovation will have a major impact on Europe’s labour markets over 
the next decade – some quote the view of Carl Benedikt Frey (one of 
our authors) and Michael Osborne that up to 45 per cent of jobs in 
the US (and by implication a similar percentage across Europe) are 
at risk from digitisation. What comes out of the essays is a clear view 
that innovation over the next decade will have two characteristics 
that impact on the labour market: it will reduce the demand for labour 
in aggregate; and it will increase the demand for high-skilled labour, 
particularly for those with skills that complement technology.
Although they want to be optimistic about the effect of technological 
innovation in boosting productivity and creating prosperity for all, 
the authors worry that the gains will not be widespread. There is no 
guarantee that enough new jobs will be created to offset the losses 
that will result from further digitisation. Innovation will further polarise 
the workforce and increase inequalities of income and wealth, perhaps 
to the point where they become a drag on overall demand and growth 
rates. Productivity gains from technological innovation increasingly 
accrue to the owners of technology and the (relatively few) workers 
required to operate it, while the vast majority face stagnant real wages 
at best, unemployment at worst.
Everyone agrees that a big part of the solution is skills development, 
although there is less agreement about how the balance of 
responsibility for this this development should be shared out 
between the state, individuals and employers. Nesta’s Stefana 
Broadbent is among those who argue that it is important to develop 
the right skills. The new jobs that will be created over the next 
decade will require people with entrepreneurial, scientific, creative 
and emotional skills. Steve Bainbridge, of Cedefop, says that EU 
countries have been improving vocational education and training 
to make it more relevant to the modern labour market, but there 
is much more to do – and, in the wake of the financial crisis, less 
money to do it with. Thor Berger and Carl Benedikt Frey, of Lund 
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and Oxford University respectively, call for a big increase in digital 
literacy, but also argue that governments need to help redundant 
workers retrain to acquire the skills required to get a new job. Sara 
de la Rica, from FEDEA and the University of the Basque Country, 
agrees: she points out that the majority of the people who will be 
in the labour market in 10 years’ time are already working and so 
argues for more skills (re)training for adults.
While accepting that technological change will be beneficial in lifting 
overall living standards in future, some worry about inequalities that 
technological innovation will create. Although she is optimistic about 
the effect of technology, Diane Coyle of Manchester University thinks 
measures will have to be taken to tackle the inequalities of wealth, 
income and power that it will create. Alan Manning, from the London 
School of Economics, comes to a similar conclusion, arguing for 
more redistributive taxation and measures to spread the ownership of 
wealth wider. Henning Meyer, also from the LSE, is more pessimistic 
about economies generating enough new jobs to offset the ones 
that will be lost, so he focusses on the need for a reallocation of 
labour among more people and for a public job guarantee for all, 
while Eurofound’s Donald Storrie is also in favour of job-sharing and 
working-time reductions, and of increased profit-sharing.
The overall message is clear: economists think technological 
innovation will cause major disruption to the European labour market 
during the next decade. While, the precise path of change cannot 
be predicted, the likely results are an increased polarisation of the 
workforce and a tendency towards greater inequalities of income 
and wealth. The best way to counter this tendency is by ensuring as 
many workers as possible have the skills that they will need to thrive 
in the digital economy. But this might not be enough, and measures 
might be needed to redistribute work; to ensure a more widespread 
distribution of the profits from investment in technology; and to shore 
up the incomes of those who lose out.
How companies are responding to change
A survey of 2,500 employers across five European countries, the 
results from which are reported in the final essay of this collection, 
found evidence to support the economists’ worries about 
polarisation. Although the survey was unable to provide any evidence 
for an increase in high- and low-skilled jobs at the expense of 
mid-skilled jobs, it did find that there was an increasing polarisation 
of skills by industry. The proportion of employees required to use 
mathematical, reading and writing and computer skills is high and 
increasing in a number of industries – including financial services, 
accountancy, legal, IT and communications and real estate – while 
the proportion using mechanical and technical skills is high and 
increasing in manufacturing and transport. But in the hospitality and 
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leisure sector and retail sector, the proportion of employees required 
to use any type of skill is relatively low and increasing at a relatively 
slow pace. In short, the workforces of some industries are becoming 
ever more skilled, but other industries appear to have settled for a 
low-skill equilibrium.
Policymakers should take note of this trend and act to reverse it. 
While they are right to seek to ensure that there are sufficient skilled 
workers for those industries that require increasing numbers of 
them, they should also devote some of their efforts to finding ways 
of helping and encouraging firms in the low-skill sectors to boost 
productivity. If they do not do so, inequalities in skills and wages 
across sectors, and thus across the economy, will grow.
However, the survey was less supportive of the view of some 
economists that structural change – globalisation and technological 
innovation in particular – is destroying jobs in Europe. According to 
the survey, the number of firms that are taking on more employees 
as a result of new technology is exactly the same as the number that 
are reducing their workforce for the same reason. And the number 
of firms that are expanding their workforce as they bring production 
in-house almost matches the number reducing their workforce as a 
result of outsourcing. There may be a lot of churn, but the net result is 
less than clear.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that Europe’s labour market will change over 
the next decade, although the extent of that change – and whether 
it represents a marked step-up in the historical pace of change – is 
disputed. There is, however, general agreement that the principal 
driver of change will be technological innovation, and it is this that 
creates the greatest uncertainty. New technologies might put at risk 
existing jobs across a wide range of occupations and industries, or 
their effect might be less dramatic; they might lead to many new types 
of job emerging, or they might not. If there is a consensus from the 
analysis and arguments put forward in this collection, it is that the 
risk of new technologies leading to an increased polarisation of the 
workforce – and thus to increased economic inequalities – is greater 
than the risk that they simply destroy more jobs than they create. It 
is this problem of polarisation that policymakers should therefore be 
working with firms to address.
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1.1 
THE OUTLOOK FOR SKILLS 
DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN 
EUROPE
TERENCE HOGARTH AND ROB WILSON 
Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick
The European Union labour market has experienced something of a 
rollercoaster ride in recent decades. Following a period in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s when there were concerns about jobless growth, the 
EU enjoyed a relatively buoyant period for employment in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. This came to an abrupt halt after 2007/08, when the 
magnitude of the financial crisis became fully apparent. 
Figure 1.1.1
EU employment, 1995–2025 (millions)
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In the period following the financial crisis, the EU economy has struggled 
to return to a trend of long-term growth in output and employment 
anything like that observed in the early 2000s. In fact, the major 
economies of the eurozone – France, Italy and Germany – have barely 
avoided falling back into recession in the post-crisis period.
Over the medium term, the outlook for output in the EU is one of 
subdued growth. This reflects not only conditions in the EU but also 
the problems that continue to afflict the global economy. Sustained 
growth in North America remains uncertain, and Japan is still struggling 
along the long path to recovery from damage done to its economy in 
the 1990s. With three-quarters of the global economy in the doldrums, 
the BRIIC countries1 and other rapidly developing economies are 
incapable of providing the much-needed stimulus to global growth that 
would offer some prospect of rapid recovery in the EU. 
The subdued outlook for output is likely to be reflected in similarly 
subdued demand for labour. The aggregate trend could nevertheless 
mask major shifts in the composition of that demand. Since the mid-
1970s, the University of Warwick Institute for Employment Research 
(IER) has produced projections of skills demand for the UK (focussing 
on occupational employment).2 Armed with an indication of how 
employment by occupation has been likely to change over the next 10 
to 15 years, policymakers have felt better able to allocate resources 
to various education and training programmes. Since the mid-2000s, 
projections by occupation have also been produced by IER, under the 
auspices of Cedefop, for each member state of the EU and for the 
EU28 in aggregate.3
These projections are part of the overall information set available to 
all those in the labour market, including individuals making their initial 
entry into the labour market as well as those already in it. This, in part, 
reflects the desire of policymakers in member states to make their 
education and training systems more responsive to the demand side, 
with an aim that these systems should be demand-led. By making 
information about the future demand for skills available, they enable 
those who are considering investing in education and training to make 
better-informed decisions. 
As well as being a source of labour market information, the underlying 
time series on which these projections are based allow us to look at 
how the EU labour market has developed over recent years, and how 
it will continue to develop over the medium term. In this essay, then, 
we focus on how demand for skills has changed and will continue to 
change, and highlight potential problems ahead.
1 Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, and China.
2 For the latest set of UK projections, see Wilson et al 2014.
3 For EU aggregate projections of skill demand, see http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/
en/events-and-projects/projects/forecasting-skill-demand-and-supply/publications
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A recent history of skills demand
Since even before the financial crisis, the EU economy has been 
facing a number of challenges. One of the principal among these is 
maintaining the EU’s share of the high-value-added segment of the 
global market. In previous decades, with increasing trade between 
the global east and west, the EU was able to transfer much of its 
production concentrated in low-value-added activities to other 
countries, such as China. Along with increasing efficiency gains in 
the manufacturing sector, this resulted in a shift towards service-
sector employment in the EU (see figure 1.1.2). The EU’s competitive 
advantage in the global market has had to be in designing and 
developing new products that would eventually be manufactured in 
the far east or Indian subcontinent. That is, its advantage is in the so-
called ‘knowledge economy’, which calls for high-level skills, ingenuity, 
and the know-how required to create the next generation of products 
and services. If the EU is to continue to compete successfully with the 
United States, Japan and China in the knowledge stakes, it needs to 
further increase the quality of its human capital – the skills, knowledge 
and accumulated experience of its workforce.
Figure 1.1.2
Trends in EU employment by sector, 2003–2025 (actual and projected)
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Source: Cedefop, ‘Forecasting skill demand and supply’ (Cedefop A)
In most EU member states, much of the shift from manufacturing 
to service-sector employment took place during the 1970s and 
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1980s, substantially altering the occupational structure of their 
labour markets. This pattern of change is continuing, as figure 1.1.2 
indicates, albeit at a slower pace. The consequence has been a 
shift towards higher-level, white-collar occupations and away from 
traditional craft and related blue-collar work. The share of employment 
concentrated in higher-level occupations is increasing, but there 
are also some increases in lower-level occupations, creating a 
phenomenon known as ‘polarisation’, leaving fewer and fewer jobs 
and workers in the middle ranks on the occupational distribution, as 
illustrated in figure 1.1.3.
Figure 1.1.3
Proportion of EU employment by occupational category, 2003–2025 
(actual and projected)
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Source: Cedefop, ‘Forecasting skill demand and supply’ (Cedefop A)
Task-based technical change (TBTC), which has replaced many 
intermediate-level jobs by processes of automation, has also had 
a profound impact on the occupational structure. TBTC does not 
affect jobs that require a relatively high degree of cognitive ability 
and task discretion – in other words, jobs in the upper section of 
the occupational hierarchy (McIntosh 2013). Nor does it affect jobs 
where there is a high level of personal service required – such as in 
hospitality and retailing – and therefore many jobs at the lower end of 
the occupational hierarchy are also unaffected. Consequently, there has 
been a hollowing-out of the skills structure, with an increasing share of 
employment in both relatively high and relatively low-skilled jobs. 
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It is becoming apparent, however, that even higher-skilled jobs are 
not necessarily immune to the effects of TBTC. Do-it-yourself kits, 
for instance, potentially substitute for the roles played by lawyers in 
conveyancing, divorces and making wills. And intelligent, automated 
systems have some capacity to squeeze out jobs at the bottom of the 
occupational hierarchy too.
How investments in skills have responded to the 
new economic conditions
These three factors – subdued economic growth, the tactical decision 
of some firms to move production to countries with lower labour 
costs, and ongoing technical change – mean that finding and keeping 
a job in the European labour market has become a more daunting 
task for its citizens. If the EU is to retain its share of the high-value-
added global market, it needs to ensure that it has the human capital 
to undertake these activities. This means being better than the 
competition, in Japan, the United States or elsewhere. To this end, 
member states have invested substantially in their education and 
training systems, to raise levels of educational attainment and overall 
levels of human capital. Educational attainment levels across the EU 
have been increasing, with the share of people entering tertiary-level 
education steadily increasing towards the EU target of 40 per cent 
(Cedefop 2013). Young people have been willing to spend longer in 
education and training, inspired in part by the difficulties they have 
experienced in entering the labour market at an appropriate level. By 
investing in this way, they are attempting to improve their prospects of 
entering a relatively high-skilled and well-paid occupation. 
But this may not be enough. Changes are also needed on the 
demand side of the labour market to ensure that the kinds of jobs 
these young people aspire to are created. This in turn demands 
innovation and entrepreneurial drive.
Figure 1.1.4 shows that growth in the proportion of people who 
are qualified at a relatively high level (a tertiary level of educational 
attainment) has outstripped growth in employment at that level. This 
is a long-established trend, and it raises concerns about the potential 
mismatch of skills in the economy: the percentage of people who are 
acquiring high-level qualifications may be outstripping actual demand 
for people at that level. 
And this has a knock-on effect: even among lower-level occupations 
there is an increasing share of people who are relatively highly 
qualified for those jobs. There are, for example, an increasing number 
of highly qualified people in elementary occupations which typically 
do not require such a level of formal qualifications. Well-qualified 
people are likely to be better able to find, secure and retain jobs, 
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even if the qualifications they hold are not required – but, in the 
process, they may be further ‘bumping down’ those at the next level 
of educational attainment.
Figure 1.1.4
High-level skills vs high-skilled employment, EU, 1996–2025 (% of 
total employment, actual and projected)
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Education and skills are in many respects merit goods: they are 
like good health, you can never have too much of them. There 
is a danger, nevertheless, that ratcheting up skill levels does not 
generate the returns expected, despite producing a higher level 
of skills supply. Instead, all that happens is that those with slightly 
lower-level skills are displaced by people with higher-level ones, 
with no discernible impact on aggregate economic performance. 
For an individual, of course, it is still rational to invest in education 
and skills, to avoid this displacement down the occupational ladder. 
For the economy as a whole, however, this constitutes a suboptimal 
allocation of resources.
An economy can never invest too much in the education of its 
population, but it needs to ensure that the skills it produces generate 
a return to those investing in them. Today, however, there are 
concerns that skill surpluses are emerging in the EU. 
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Figure 1.1.5, for example, shows the extent to which people with 
relatively high-level qualifications are working, increasingly, in 
low-skilled jobs. This does not necessarily demonstrate that skill 
surpluses exist – it may, for instance, simply reflect the fact that 
keeping and progressing within a job is becoming more difficult. But 
the trend over time is towards more people with high skills working in 
low-skilled jobs.
Figure 1.1.5
Proportion of high-skilled workers by occupational category, EU, 2003 
and 2025 (actual and projected)
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Source: Cedefop, ‘Forecasting skill demand and supply’ (Cedefop A) 
Note: ‘High-skilled’ here means people who attained tertiary level education.
Making smarter skills investments
Any individual making a personal investment in education and 
skills needs information about the likely return they can expect, to 
ensure that such investments support their career ambitions, just as 
governments and education systems need information to inform the 
courses provided. On a national scale, a lack of information about the 
dynamics of the labour market and what it values economically can 
result in mismatches occurring: too few of some skills, too many of 
others. Projections of demand for skills of the kind produced by IER 
for Cedefop, and used in this essay, begin to provide that information, 
indicating where there is likely to be the greatest demand for skills 
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in the future and the educational profile of people who work in those 
jobs. The EU is still in the relatively early stages of developing a 
sophisticated labour market information system comparable to that 
of O*NET in the US, which is able to provide detailed information 
about the future demand for jobs at a highly disaggregated level, 
the qualifications and skills required to enter a specific occupation, 
and the wage rate likely to be obtained.4 But a substantial start has 
been made, and this should both help individuals to make informed 
decisions about investing in their own education and skills, and enable 
policymakers to prevent costly skills mismatches from opening up in 
their national labour markets.
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1.2 
EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS 
IN THE COMING DECADE
JONATHAN WADSWORTH 
Royal Holloway College
No self-respecting economist should try to predict the future. 
Unforeseen events have a habit of coming along to upset the best-
made forecasts. Economic fashions are also rather capricious. Today, 
no one sees Ireland as the economic success story it was held up to 
be 10 years ago. Germany, Sweden, Japan and the United States, 
along with the UK, have each in their turn been held up as an economic 
paragon, only to subsequently fall from grace. No doubt a new 
champion will emerge from the present downturn and recovery. This 
experience counsels us to exercise care when looking for evidence of 
what works, or when setting out policy prescriptions. 
Furthermore, before we can gauge future success, we need a set of 
guidelines for how that success will be measured, and it is not clear 
that we are even at that point. Labour market performance should be 
judged against many different criteria; success (or failure) needs to 
be determined by more than one performance indicator. This means 
moving away from a reliance on the unemployment rate, important 
though that is, and towards alternative, complementary measures 
of spare labour capacity – including the employment rate, but also 
measures of hours worked and wage growth.
The distribution around average measures also matters. Generally we 
would favour, for example, an economy that manages to combine 
a low unemployment rate with low dispersion around the average, 
whether the disaggregation is by skill, region or any other metric. The 
duration of joblessness is also a key measure of performance, and 
other measures of concentration, like the workless household rate or 
measures of wage inequality, will be useful complementary indicators. 
The dynamics of the labour market also matter, yet too often they are 
overlooked. The speed at which jobless individuals find work or the 
rate of job loss are important. For a given level of wage inequality in 
an economy, the issue becomes much more important if individuals 
towards the bottom of the distribution remain at the same level over 
time than if they are able to move up. 
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Labour demand
Labour demand is a derived demand: labour is demanded to produce 
an output and is not employed as an end in itself. This means 
that without output growth, it is much more difficult to maintain 
employment at a high level. Okun’s law – which states that 2 per 
cent growth is needed before the unemployment rate comes down 
– has held, broadly, for the last 50 years in most western European 
countries, and this is unlikely to change much in the near future. 
Moreover, growth needs to be measured on a per-capita or per-
hour-worked basis: it is relatively easy to generate growth when the 
population is rising, but much harder to ensure that this generates 
rising wealth for all, as the UK has recently discovered.
The UK has, however, experienced a surprisingly good employment record 
in recent years. There has been a growing understanding here that wages 
rather than employment took the strain of the labour market shock that 
occurred after the 2007/08 crisis. This was clearly true: UK employment 
probably fell by 1 million less than expected because of an unprecedented 
fall in real wages.1 However, it still took growth of more than 2 per cent 
for the unemployment rate to start falling. Steady growth seems to be 
necessary for continued good performance in the labour market.
While notions of a common or universal level of performance or 
policy response probably do not hold, all economies are subject, 
to a degree, to common international trends, such as continuing 
innovation in information technology, rising international trade, and 
increasing movement of capital and labour. How different economies 
respond to these pressures is likely to be of interest to policymakers. 
Alfred Marshall’s laws of labour demand, first formulated over 120 
years ago, are still likely to be relevant in this regard.2
Innovations in technology are likely to continue to reduce the need for 
labour to do routine work. While innovation may also generate the need 
for complementary skilled labour, the former is likely to be the larger 
effect. This is not to say that labour markets will not absorb the impact; 
technology has been making inroads into labour for over 200 years and 
aggregate employment has largely kept on track. But it is likely that 
the nature of work will continue to evolve in the face of technological 
innovation, and that some people will lose out. Policy can help here by 
facilitating alternatives in areas that are suffering from industrial decline.
Employees in tradable sectors are also likely to be at greater risk 
of competition raised by capital moving to countries where labour 
1 One million jobs is roughly equivalent to a 10 per cent fall in the UK wage bill, 
assuming employment of 30 million and average wages of £25,000 a year.
2 These define the sensitivity of labour demand to a range of factors and were first 
set out in Marshall’s Principles of Economics in 1890, but can be found in any 
standard economics textbook.
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costs are lower. The harder it is to substitute employees’ labour and 
the lower their share of total production costs, the less vulnerable 
they will be. In the future, then, most Europeans are likely to be 
employed in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, the issue 
becomes how to ensure that revenues and hence wages in these 
sectors are sufficiently high that employees are able to participate in 
the economy. If there are economic rents to be had in a given sector, 
it will be easier to pay higher wages, although this means in turn 
that customers may have to pay more for certain services. Several 
professions – such as finance and insurance – have managed to 
operate in this way, so it can be done. Nonetheless, whether capital 
will concede some ground to labour in order to bring this about, and 
if so how, are important issues going forward.
Labour supply
There are essentially two elements to labour supply: the extensive 
and intensive margins. The extensive margin concerns numbers of 
people. Over the past 50 years or so, the potential labour supply of 
most European economies has increased as the result of increased 
participation by women and, to a lesser extent, by workers beyond 
the statutory retirement age, as well as, in some countries, because 
of immigration. These factors are offset to a small degree by the 
expansion of tertiary education, which keeps younger people out of 
the labour market for longer.3
The scope for further expansion of the labour supply by enabling 
increased participation of women is probably not as great now as 
it once was, at least in northern and western Europe. Over the next 
decade the share of men and women in the workforce is likely to 
approach parity in many European countries4. Instead, it is more likely 
that rising participation will come from the other sources, subject to 
demand. Earlier downturns have seen many older workers moved 
out of the labour market, few of whom were incentivised or even 
able, because of lack of opportunities, to return. Now, however, older 
workers are, on average, healthier than their counterparts from earlier 
decades, which should aid their return to work. Concerns about 
possible conflicts between older and younger generations are unlikely 
to be realised – indeed, this is one aspect of the lump of labour 
fallacy. If the economy expands there is likely to be room for all, and 
older and younger workers do not appear to be particularly close 
substitutes, and so unlikely to be in direct competition.
3 See OECD Employment Outlook for details on these trends. Of course, students 
can work while studying. In the UK, while the share of youth engaged in tertiary 
education continues to increase, the proportion of full-time students who also 
work seems to have been falling over the last 10 years see for example http://
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_257979.pdf
4 See OECD Employment Outlook
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The second primary source of labour supply is immigration. 
Immigration is likely to remain a contentious issue in Europe for some 
years. As long as there are differences in economic performance there 
will always be pressures on individuals to move toward economies 
that are doing well and away from those that are doing less well. 
Economies that are doing well seem, so far, to have been able 
to absorb rising inflows of individuals, at least economically if not 
politically. The consequences for the sending countries need not be 
bad, concerns about ‘brain drain’ aside. Any shortages caused by 
loss of labour should help to drive up wages among those who remain 
(the reserve army of labour effect in reverse). The question here, then, 
is how quickly this will happen.
The intensive margin of labour supply concerns how long people work 
and how productive they are. This, in turn, partly depends on how 
skilled they are. Productivity growth is generally regarded as good 
because this is one, though not the only, important driver of growth 
– and with it labour demand. Skilled workers are, on balance, more 
productive than those who are less skilled, so a highly educated/
trained workforce in both academic and vocational skills is likely 
to continue to be needed, if productivity growth is the assumed 
objective. Over the next decade, for the first time, the majority of 
the workforce in many European countries will be skilled to tertiary 
education level. However, forecasting future specific skill requirements 
is difficult, so policymakers may be better ensuring the provision of 
general skills training in universities and technical schools to produce 
a high-skilled workforce.
Trends in hours worked are influenced by the extent of part-time 
working and overtime, and fluctuations in the standard length of the 
working week or year. The issue of job security and temporary work 
is also a perennial source of concern. Nonetheless, although there 
have been increases in some of these atypical forms of working in 
some countries since the financial crisis, these are can be seen as 
cyclical fluctuations. Taking a longer view and looking through the 
economic cycle, they have not grown substantially over the last 20 
years – although this needs to be monitored and if things change 
then policymakers need to address any disadvantages for affected 
workers. For many workers, the best protection from such non-
standard forms of work is an economy operating at near capacity. 
How resistant capital is to the consequences of full employment, 
notably rising labour costs, is an important issue to consider.
The more things change…
Across Europe, many different economic systems coexist, and 
economies, firms and workers are experiencing a great variety 
of labour market outcomes. Consider just one commonly used 
indicator: the harmonised national unemployment rate. The mean for 
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the EU is currently around 10 per cent, but this conceals a spread 
of 21 percentage points, from 5 per cent in Denmark to 26 per 
cent in Greece (Eurostat A). This variability makes common policy 
prescriptions across Europe difficult – and indeed unadvisable. One 
real debate still to be had is whether minimal regulation and limited 
institutions are the key to economic success, or whether targeted, 
costed and evaluated interventions can help to alleviate labour market 
failures. The key to resolving this debate is to compare outcomes 
after  policy interventions with an explicit counterfactual case. This is 
not easy, because it is hard to disentangle the effects of policy from 
the effects of the many other factors that determine labour market 
outcomes, but researchers are applying new evauation techniques to 
the problem and their results are eagerly anticipated. However, it is 
debateable whether any country could rapidly move from one system 
to another, dismantling or establishing institutions that typically take 
decades to set up. Incremental change is likely to be the best that 
can be expected.
While technology, stability and growth have improved the lives of most 
Europeans significantly over the last century, many basic features 
of the labour market of the 1930s still exist now, and are likely to 
continue to do so. Therefore, we can say with some confidence that 
future patterns of unemployment (and employment) are likely to be 
based on the same interplay of skill-level, age and location that have 
determined rates of joblessness for decades.5 Younger, less skilled 
workers in peripheral regions of any country are much less likely to 
be in work, and this is likely to remain so. On the flipside, workers 
in non-tradable service sectors that can generate rents are likely to 
be more secure. It is hard for policymakers and others to anticipate 
what may or may not happen over the medium to long term, and 
so it is probably better for them to ensure that the right supporting 
infrastructure and institutions are in place, alongside a willingness to 
act in the face of shocks. Policymakers need to base their judgments 
around a broader range of measures of performance, but without 
per-capita growth, any improvement or adjustment to the inevitable 
pressures pushing against less-skilled labour will be much more 
difficult to achieve.
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1.3 
PROJECTING LABOUR 
PRODUCTIVITY
ANDRIES DE JONG AND MARK TER VEER 
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
The size and shape of the labour force is determined by a combination 
of demographic trends within the working-age population and trends 
in labour force participation. The EU labour force expanded steadily 
over the second half of the last century and, beneath this rising trend, 
there were some impressive changes in participation. For example, 
since 1960, male labour force participation has been decreasing all over 
Europe, while the opposite has been true for female participation. 
Looking ahead, in order to anticipate potential trajectories for the 
labour force, we have formulated four policy scenarios for labour force 
participation. Participation refers to the degree to which people are 
involved in the labour force, whether they have a job or are actively 
looking for work. In general, fluctuations in the participation rate 
are caused by changes in participation levels among three broad 
categories of non-working people: young people in education and 
initial training, older retired or disabled persons, and women who 
have left the labour market to care for their children. So our policy 
scenarios have been formulated principally in terms of changes 
in these three categories, under the influence of better or worse 
economic conditions and policymakers’ preference (or not) for 
promoting social and regional cohesion.
Four scenarios for future labour force participation 
in Europe
As part of the ESPON project DEMIFER – Demographic and Migratory 
Flows affecting European Regions and City (2010) – four scenarios for 
the future shape of the labour force have been developed. 
Scenario 1: Growing Social Europe
In this first scenario, we assume a combination of high economic 
growth and policies oriented towards social and regional cohesion. 
This leads to an increase in the economic activity rate of people 
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of all working ages, although the rate of change varies between 
the sexes and age-groups. The educational level of the population 
increases, and more and more young people combine education 
with employment, helped by an increase in part-time jobs. The 
flourishing economy stimulates employers to create opportunities 
for women to combine work and raising children, particularly in a 
growing service sector. Women with young children are enabled 
to enter the labour force through measures such as extended 
childcare facilities and flexible jobs, particularly in the government 
service sector. As a result, other countries converge on the high 
activity rates for women and young people already witnessed in the 
Scandinavian countries.
In this scenario, measures are also taken to postpone retirement, 
such as encouraging more flexible working arrangements. This 
leads to a considerable increase in the participation of both men 
and women aged 50 and over. This scenario is further characterised 
by policies stimulating regional cohesion.1 In the long run, this 
leads to similar patterns in labour force participation rates across 
European countries.
Scenario 2: Expanding Market Europe
In this scenario, the economy flourishes and economic 
circumstances are even better than in the Growing Social Europe 
scenario. A market philosophy dominates the political climate. 
Increasing economic activity and lower labour taxation lead to a 
strong increase in the demand for labour, and the educational level 
of citizens increases. However, post-compulsory education is seen 
as a private investment and is not well financed from the public 
purse. So, in order to finance their education, young people have to 
combine school with (part-time) employment. Under this scenario, 
part-time jobs are abundantly available, specifically created for 
students, in order to capitalise on the high supply of labour.
For other groups, such as elderly people and women with young 
children, entry into the labour market becomes easier. Employers 
attract women by creating flexible jobs that the combination of 
motherhood with outside employment, and a growing private service 
sector also offers additional opportunities for women to find suitable 
work. In this scenario, unlike in scenario 1, the market philosophy 
leads to a divergence in regional economic performance, reflecting the 
absence of policy measures to counter the trend for economic growth 
and labour participation to be much higher in the stronger economic 
regions than in weaker regions.
1 For example, skills and infrastructure policies to support inward investment in 
regions suffering most from the loss of ‘traditional’ jobs.
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Scenario 3: Limited Social Europe
In the Limited Social Europe scenario, we assume that policymakers 
strive to attain social and regional cohesion, as in the first scenario, 
but economic prospects are gloomy. Households have trouble coping 
with rising costs as the financial effects of climate change become 
visible and energy prices increase. The demand for labour falls, 
causing a severe drop in labour force participation, as conditions 
discourage people from continuing to seek work. Opportunities for 
young people to combine work and school attendance fall as a result 
of fierce competition in a tight labour market. Young people tend to 
stay longer in full-time education programmes, in order to enhance 
career opportunities. For women with young children, the prospects of 
finding paid employment are not good, partly due to a scarcity of part-
time jobs. Financial problems lead to dramatic cutbacks in the service 
sector. A preference for early retirement prevails, as governments 
give priority to the absorption of young people into the labour market, 
reducing opportunities for older workers to remain or return.
Although economic stagnation is widespread, it is more severe in 
poorer than richer regions. Especially in economically weak regions, 
the demand for labour is low, unemployment is high and labour force 
participation declines. However, due to policies that aim for regional 
cohesion, the negative effects, especially for weaker regions, may be 
softened by jobs created by government, specifically for the long-term 
unemployed. As a result, disparities between regions largely remain 
unchanged from their current levels.
Scenario 4: Challenged Market Europe
In this final scenario, economic growth plummets and severe 
environmental problems arise. This leads to a restructuring of the 
economy; weaker firms do not manage to survive, while larger and 
stronger firms dominate the economic landscape. The lack of jobs 
induces young people to prolong their educational careers, leading to 
a decline in their labour force participation. Policies are not directed 
at creating opportunities for women to combine work with care for 
children. Increasing unemployment and worsening conditions in the 
labour market discourage both men and women from actively seeking 
work. Although policies do not promote early retirement, employers are 
happy for older employees to stop working, because their productivity 
levels are perceived to be lower than those of younger people, and so 
the participation rate of this older age-group falls.
In this scenario, the poorly performing regions are expected to suffer 
the most from low economic growth. In these areas, participation 
drops considerably, while relatively little change occurs in the 
economically stronger regions. Thus, there is a continued increase in 
regional divergence.
331.3 De Jong and ter Veer
The size and shape of Europe’s future labour force
For each of the four policy scenarios, we estimate the future size of 
the labour force in line with projections of scenario-specific working 
age-group populations and labour force participation rates. In 
recent decades, the labour force has grown continuously, but only 
in the Expanding Market Europe scenario (scenario 2) is the labour 
force expected to be larger in 2050 than it was in 2005 – and even 
this growth is modest, by only 5 per cent. In this scenario, higher 
participation rates are combined with a more or less stable working-
age population. By contrast, in the Growing Social Europe scenario 
(1), rising labour force participation rates are offset by contraction in 
the size of the labour force. 
The two other policy scenarios sketch a future characterised by a 
shrinking labour force. In the Challenged Market Europe scenario 
(4), this downturn is limited to a 10 per cent fall from 2005 levels. 
As the pattern of participation rates largely resembles the current 
pattern, the decrease in labour force numbers is caused primarily by 
a shrinking population. In the Limited Social Europe scenario (3), the 
contraction of the labour force is very large: a combination of declining 
participation rates and negative population growth is expected to 
cause a decline of 20 per cent in workforce numbers by 2050.
In recent decades, the gender composition of the labour force has 
gradually changed, as the share of women has increased. In the 
Expanding Market Europe scenario, this gradual feminisation of 
the labour force is assumed to continue into the future, while in the 
Growing Social Europe scenario, the gender composition is taken 
to be unchanged from present. However, both the Limited Social 
Europe and Challenged Market Europe scenarios predict a decline in 
the share of women in the labour force, because the poor economic 
performance of these two scenarios impacts more heavily on the 
labour-intensive service sectors, which employ more women than 
other industrial sectors.
Overall future trends within the European labour force are more 
or less mirrored at a national level, although growth paths show 
some differences between nations. In the Expanding Market Europe 
scenario, about half of the countries experience a growing labour 
force up to 2050, while the other half have to cope with a shrinking 
labour force, mainly as a result of a fall in birth rates that already 
makes a shrinking population inevitable. In the other three scenarios, 
most countries will be confronted with more or less severe 
decreases in labour force numbers. This is particularly dramatic in 
the Limited Social Europe scenario, according to which almost all 
countries will face a declining labour force, and for nearly half this 
decline will amount to almost 40 per cent. And this negative trend is 
even more severe for women than for men.
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In general, labour force prospects are considerably better in western 
and northern Europe, while eastern European nations in particular 
face setbacks. Germany, however, is an exception to this rule: even 
under the favourable conditions of the Expanding Market Europe 
scenario, it is expected to see a 20 per cent decline in the size of its 
labour force between 2005 and 2050. Under the poor conditions of 
the Limited Social Europe scenario, this decline could be as large as 
35 per cent. This outcome is largely due to a shrinking population, 
caused by ongoing low fertility rates – the average number of children 
per woman in Germany is just 1.4, well short of the 2.1 needed to 
replace the current population. By contrast, in the UK, the prospects 
for a growing labour force are positive under all scenarios, with 
projected growth figures ranging between 5 per cent and 50 per cent 
for the 2005–2050 period.
Projected declines in the labour force could be mitigated by 
increased migration from outside Europe. Already, policymakers have 
implemented measures to utilise immigration from outside Europe as a 
means of filling foreseen gaps in the labour force. In several countries 
in southern Europe in particular, the demand for labour migrants may 
become urgent, as these countries are more likely to experience a 
shrinking labour force yet their economies are characterised by a high 
proportion of labour-intensive jobs.
The impact of labour productivity on growth and 
future prosperity
If growth in the size of the labour force slackens or even becomes 
negative, productivity growth will become an even more important 
driver of economic growth. It may be assumed that, at unchanging 
labour productivity levels, GDP per active person will remain constant. 
According to each of the four scenarios, this would lead to a big 
drop in prosperity in the EU countries by 2050, ranging from a 
decrease in GDP per capita of about 10 per cent in the Expanding 
Market Europe scenario to about 20 per cent in the Limited Social 
Europe scenario. This decrease can be attributed to the ageing of the 
population, leading to a larger share of inactive people, in combination 
with a substantially shrinking labour force under the two low-growth 
scenarios. It is clear, therefore, that raising labour productivity levels is 
a necessary step to counter the risk of falling prosperity.
In order to illustrate the effect of increasing labour productivity, let us 
assume for each of our four scenarios that GDP per active person is 
20 per cent higher in 2050 than it was in 2005. It must be stressed 
that these calculations are rather speculative, as they do not involve 
explicit assumptions on changes in the sectoral composition of the 
economy (and regional disparities), improvements in technology, 
substitution of labour by capital, or changes in the gender and age 
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composition of the labour force. In three of the four scenarios, GDP 
per capita will rise somewhat between 2005 and 2050, with growth 
figures of around 5 per cent. However, in the Limited Social Europe 
scenario, this increase in productivity is still not enough to prevent a 
fall in prosperity, and GDP per capita will be 5 per cent less.
As these figures illustrate, there is an urgent need to ensure growth 
in labour productivity across Europe. Across all four policy scenarios, 
prosperity is expected to fall markedly in the future if labour 
productivity does not improve. Therefore, policies aimed at increasing 
the size of the labour force should be supplemented by those that 
aim to raise labour productivity. In line with the Lisbon Strategy and 
Europe 2020, this should include investment in human capital, with a 
focus on new skills.
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1.4 
WHAT DO CURRENT TRENDS 
TELL US ABOUT THE BRITISH 
LABOUR MARKET OF 
TOMORROW?
MATTHEW WHITTAKER 
Resolution Foundation
Typically the best way of predicting what the weather will do tomorrow 
is to assume that it will be the same as today. This doesn’t mean the 
outlook never alters; simply that change tends to be grounded in the 
present. Likewise, when considering the labour market of tomorrow, it 
makes sense to look at the trends already at work. Of course, the recent 
economic climate has been stormy, and not all of today’s conditions 
will persist over time – but some will, and not necessarily just those that 
were already in evidence before the recent downturn. It is often the case 
that the labour market goes through a step change over the course of a 
downturn and recovery, which shapes its structure during a subsequent 
phase of stable economic expansion.
With that in mind, this essay assesses the prospects for the 
continuation in or reversal of five recent trends in the UK – some 
clearly long-term and structural, others more recent and not yet sure 
to remain as the economy recovers – and considers the implications 
associated with each of these. Although the focus is on the UK, 
each of these trends is replicated in other European countries, so the 
lessons to be learned are broad.
Increased labour supply
Underpinning the surprising resilience of employment since 2008, 
through the course of a major economic crisis, has been a significant 
increase in the number of people declaring themselves economically 
active. This is all the more unexpected given that the assumption had 
been that ageing in the population would reduce labour supply over 
this period regardless. In part, this increase in supply is likely to reflect 
an increased need to work associated with the heightened pressures 
on household finances in recent years, and so it may dissipate over 
the coming years as incomes start to recover. 
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Yet, while this driver may prove temporary, there are several other 
factors that point to the possibility of a permanent increase in supply. 
Removal of the default retirement age and initial steps towards 
equalising the state pension age for women and men by 2018 have 
boosted the supply of older female workers in particular, reinforcing 
a trend that was in train before the financial crisis. With the pension 
age for men and women set to be lifted again in coming years and 
interest rates projected to remain low (with implications for the 
adequacy of pension returns), we might expect further expansion of 
supply among older age-groups. At the same time, welfare reforms 
appear to have permanently boosted supply through a combination 
of incentives and conditionality.
The recent increase in supply has, of course, been associated 
with falling real wage levels. As such, the relationship between 
unemployment and pay appears to have shifted, with the Bank of 
England reducing its estimate of the UK non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to around 5.5 per cent (BoE 2014). It 
may be lower still. Tomorrow’s labour market may be one in which the 
unemployment rate falls towards levels last seen in Britain in the early 
1970s while, at the same time, the employment rate rises above the 
highs of the pre-crash 2000s.
The long-term drift towards a service sector economy
Recent evidence of ‘reshoring’1 – whereby firms return production 
processes to the UK – offers a flicker of hope that, after decades of 
decline, manufacturing’s share of economic output may well rise in 
the coming decade. However, corresponding employment growth in 
manufacturing appears unlikely to keep pace with that projected in 
the big service sectors – business, finance, retail and hospitality – and 
so its share of overall employment will continue to decline. Crucially, 
perpetuation of these existing trends would have implications for how 
the proceeds of future economic growth will be distributed to workers.
Manufacturing is characterised by a relatively high ‘labour share’ – the 
proportion of economic gains that flow to the workforce rather than 
the owners of production. In contrast, business and – more acutely – 
finance have much lower labour shares, with the focus instead being 
on the distribution of profits to shareholders. The changing shape of 
our economy in recent decades has therefore been associated with 
some rebalancing of gains away from workers and towards owners 
(although this pattern has been less marked in the UK than in other 
advanced economies). The contraction of manufacturing employment 
and expansion of services matters also for the distribution of wages 
across the workforce. It brings with it a relative fall in the share of 
1 See for example: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/businesses-are-
coming-back/businesses-are-coming-back
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mid-pay (manufacturing) jobs and an increase in the share of higher-
pay (finance and business) and lower-pay (retail and hospitality 
services) ones. And with manufacturing providing more regularly 
spaced career rungs than other sectors, its decline is also associated 
with an overall reduction in pay progression opportunities.
Taken together, these movements help to explain why employees in 
the bottom half of the earnings distribution saw their share of each 
£1 of value generated in the UK economy fall by one-quarter between 
1997 and the start of the financial crisis in 2007 – from 16p to 12p 
(Whittaker and Savage 2011). In the absence of a concerted effort 
towards industrial rebalancing, we might expect to see this trend 
continue as the economy normalises post-crisis.
The hollowing out of the labour force
Such industrial polarisation is of course mirrored in the ‘hollowing 
out’ of occupations.2 The UK, in common with many other European 
economies, has experienced the fastest employment growth among 
the highest- and lowest-skilled jobs in recent decades, with the share of 
mid-skilled jobs correspondingly falling. Although the pattern is well-
established over the longer term, the UK trend appears more nuanced 
than is sometimes thought. Research has suggested that polarisation 
was less evident in the immediate pre-crisis years of the 2000s, with 
the employment share of higher-skilled occupations increasing sharply 
alongside a corresponding fall in the bottom 70 per cent of occupations 
(Pessoa and Plunkett 2013). 
However, tentative findings suggest a new phase of polarisation 
since 2008. Between 2008 and 2012, employment growth was 
clearly strongest among low- and high-skilled occupations, while 
the employment share fell among mid-skilled jobs (ibid). It remains 
to be seen whether further hollowing out occurs as economic 
recovery builds but, unless the recent shift is reversed, tomorrow’s 
labour market will remain more polarised than the one that existed 
immediately prior to the crisis.
The rise of non-standard employee contracts
Some economists have argued that industrial and occupational 
polarisation is driving the development of a ‘two-tier’ workforce. By 
way of support, they point to the apparent growth of less secure 
forms of work in recent times. In reality, the picture is mixed.
The number of temporary workers has increased significantly, totalling 
almost 1.7 million in September–November 2014 (ONS 2015). 
2 See Hogarth and Wilson in this volume for a European picture of polarisation.
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However, this trend appears to be directly associated with the 
economic downturn. Numbers fell steadily in the pre-crisis years, and 
subsequent increases were associated with a rise in the proportion of 
people who stated that they were working on a temporary basis only 
because they were unable to find a permanent job. However, despite 
strong improvements in the labour market in the last 12 months, 
the share of employees on temporary contracts has continued to 
increase. With the proportion of ‘involuntarily temps’ simultaneously 
falling, there is some suggestion that the rise in temporary working 
will persist for some time yet.
Alongside temporary work, much attention in recent years has 
focussed on the use of so-called ‘zero-hours contracts’. Although 
figures are difficult to pin down, the ONS estimates that some 
1.4 million ‘contracts without guaranteed hours’ were in place at the 
start of 2014.3 While no consistent data exists for earlier periods, 
alternative measures suggest that numbers have increased sharply in 
a short space of time. As with temporary working, it is likely that part 
of this increase is cyclical. However, more than one in 10 businesses 
are believed to have made use of such contracts, rising to nearly half 
of large employers. And, according to one survey for the Chartered 
Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD), nearly half of those 
employers using zero-hours contracts view them as a long-term 
feature of their workforce strategy.4
So, while it’s too early to draw any definitive conclusions, there are at 
least tentative signs to suggest that some part of the recent increase 
in non-standard employee contracts is here to stay.
The sharp increase in self-employment
The other major trend of recent years has been the sharp rise in 
self-employment, with increases in such workers accounting for 
around two-thirds of jobs growth since 2008. They now account 
for around one in seven of the British workforce (ONS 2015). Again, 
there is evidence to suggest that some of this increase is cyclical. 
One-quarter of those becoming self-employed in the post-crisis 
years did so due to a lack of better work alternatives (compared 
with just 10 per cent among the pre-crisis self-employed). And 
regional comparisons point to a relationship (albeit weak) between 
self-employment and rising unemployment. Having risen sharply in 
recent years, the number of self-employed levelled off in 2014 as the 
economic recovery gained momentum.
3 This is a broader definition than the narrower zero-hours contract measure 
sometimes used and the number relates to contracts not people (with an unspecified 
number of people holding more than one contract); see ONS 2014.
4 A further one-quarter said they formed a medium-term strategy, with just 15 per cent 
declaring them a short-term measure and 16 per cent not knowing (CIPD 2013).
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However, there are a number of reasons for thinking that the self-
employed will continue to form an increased share of the future labour 
force. Most fundamentally, the recent increase has its roots in the pre-
crisis years, with self-employment rising steadily from the early-2000s 
onwards. And, while a sizeable minority of the most recent entrants 
say that they had no better alternatives, three-quarters actively chose 
to be self-employed (D’Arcy and Gardiner 2014).5
Conclusions: supporting tomorrow’s labour market
Any projections are necessarily speculative, but based on what’s already 
in evidence we can envisage a future labour market in the UK and in 
Europe more widely in which more people work, with a shift towards 
women and older workers. We might expect a growing share of workers 
to be part-time, subject to non-standard contracts or self-employed. 
And ‘business as usual’ is likely to mean a growing polarisation between 
high-paying and low-paying industries and occupations.
Some of these changes are positive; others will bring new challenges 
– or, more accurately, will reinforce the need to meet existing 
challenges – not least concerning low pay and worker rights. We 
should eschew fatalism and seek new ways of utilising technology 
and globalisation to halt the hollowing out of our labour force. In part, 
this requires long-term supply-side solutions relating to education, 
but more immediate interventions designed to boost demand in the 
form of mid-skilled jobs may also bear fruit.
To the extent that some of these trends will persist even in the face 
of such action, we may need to review how appropriate our labour 
market institutions and public policies are for the new workplace. 
With union membership on a long-term downward trajectory, we will 
need to find new approaches to collective bargaining and workforce 
support. If industrial changes mean that more of the proceeds of 
growth flow to owners rather than workers – to capital rather than 
labour – then we should look again at ways of redistributing asset 
ownership and shifting some of the burden of taxation away from 
labour income and towards wealth. Tackling our low pay problem 
requires politicians first to acknowledge that it exists, before 
establishing a strategy that is both meaningful and realistic. If low 
pay increasingly comes hand-in-hand with instability of income and 
hours of work, then we will need to review the adequacy of our 
working-age welfare system, even as an increasing emphasis is 
placed on reducing expenditure in the pursuit of deficit reduction.
And we should begin now. We may not yet know what conditions 
tomorrow will bring, but choosing an outfit that fits today’s mixed 
bag of weather is likely to prove a pretty good place to start. 
5 For more on self-employment see Hatfield 2014
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1.5 
PREPARING FOR 
TOMORROW’S WORLD OF 
WORK
PETER GLOVER AND HANNAH HOPE 
UK Commission for Employment and Skills
The last 20 years have seen huge changes in the European labour 
market. These changes have been driven by a range of factors, 
particularly the interlinked forces of globalisation and technology. At the 
current pace of change, we can expect the typical workplace of 2030 
to look very different to what we see today – but we cannot predict with 
any precision what exactly this will mean. Twenty years ago there was a 
widespread belief that a defining feature of the labour market would be 
radically reduced working hours and increased leisure time. Fast forward 
to 2015 – the year in which mobile technology is set to overtake the 
desktop as the principal means of accessing the internet – and our work 
and leisure hours are increasingly blurred.
We can, however, explore future possibilities and systematically 
make sense of potential directions of travel. This enables us to start 
to position ourselves to anticipate opportunities rather than waiting 
to react. The UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) 
has developed an authoritative assessment of future challenges and 
opportunities in the UK labour market which draws out possible 
implications for jobs and skills. The Future of Work study seeks to 
trigger debate about how we can best invest in skills for the future 
(see Störmer et al 2014).
Our assessment of future jobs and skills is based on a robust, 
evidence-based approach and uses foresight techniques to explore 
the future, including a comprehensive literature review, expert 
interviews and high-level workshops. We analyse existing trends that 
are shaping the future of jobs and skills and also identify plausible 
disruptions to these trends. We explore four different development 
paths, or scenarios, for the UK labour market up to 2030. Based on 
current trends, the first scenario outlines how a ‘business as usual’ 
landscape might develop, while the remaining three feature more 
disruptive developments.
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Envisaging the future workplace
Europe’s labour market is forecast to create over 19 million new 
jobs requiring high-level skills by 2025 (EU Skills Panorama 2014). 
At the same time, the proportion of young people in the workforce 
will increase, older people will lengthen their working lifespans, 
and more women will enter the labour market (Wilson et al 2014). 
Workplaces will be multigenerational and continued global mobility 
will mean that they grow in ethnic and national diversity.
Work environments will be pervaded in every way by technology. 
Workers who perform routine tasks that can be replaced or 
deskilled by technology will continue to be vulnerable. Facilitated 
by technology, workplaces and ways of working will become 
increasingly virtual. Businesses and individuals will become more 
flexible, in a shift towards a 24-hour society. Already, businesses are 
increasingly able to create and disband corporate divisions rapidly, 
as they shift tasks between slimmed down pools of long-term 
core employees, international colleagues and outsourced external 
service providers. In 2013, 67 per cent of employees worldwide 
were working in more actively collaborative ways, while 57 per cent 
reported an increase in the number of their coworkers based in other 
countries (Thompson and Truch 2013). 
It is likely that the resulting flexibility in employment relationships 
will place the onus on individuals to take the core responsibility 
for their skills development, as widely distributed and increasingly 
virtual workforces mean that maintaining skills presents a 
challenge to traditional management practices. At the same time, 
leaner management structures and virtual workforces will vest 
individuals with greater autonomy, making the importance of self-
management paramount. 
The boundaries between disciplines, such as between natural 
sciences and informatics, are becoming increasingly blurred. As 
disciplines converge, so do their technologies. The convergence 
of technologies and cross-disciplinary skills can disrupt existing 
business models, but also create completely new markets 
and novel applications. In turn, it creates a need for effective 
interdisciplinary working and increases demand for hybrid skills.
Structurally, we can expect to see the development of new 
business ecosystems. Many companies will be less concerned 
with their internal capabilities and more focused on the value 
they can draw from external networks. This will lead to a greater 
degree of collaboration across value chains and outsourcing of 
tasks to external project teams, facilitated by the virtualisation of 
business processes. Companies and workers will need the ability to 
collaborate across virtual teams, demonstrate cultural sensitivity and 
manage complexity.
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The quantity and richness of data generated by the digital economy 
is growing rapidly: it is projected that by 2017 the amount of data 
traversing global networks in one year will exceed the total amount of 
data accumulated between 1984 and 2012 (Cisco 2013). Analysing 
this data offers a tremendous opportunity to identify potential 
efficiency gains and new business models and niches.
Globally, economic power is shifting towards emerging economies, 
resulting in growing international competition for business. In the last 
decade, China has quintupled its number of graduates and doubled 
its number of higher education institutions (OECD 2012). With Asia 
projected to account for about 60 per cent of global middle-class 
consumption in 2030, the continent promises high growth and 
profitable investment opportunities along with a strong and growing 
workforce (Pezzini 2012).
Finally, these trends should be seen against a backdrop of challenges 
to governments’ scope to invest in employment and education 
initiatives. The competing fiscal pressures of growing social transfer 
payments, pension burdens and public debt make this form of 
investment increasingly difficult.
While the scenarios in the UKCES study focus on the UK labour 
market, the analysis is based on global trends and disruptions, such 
as globalisation and technological advance, which hold important and 
relevant lessons for the wider European labour market. Furthermore, 
the British and European markets have some of these trends in 
common, including an ageing workforce, increasing numbers of 
people with high-level qualifications, an expectation that more 
women will want to work, and an expectation that jobs will become 
increasingly skill-intensive (Cedefop 2013).
Exploring potential disruptions
In sketching out possible futures it is not wise to rely on the 
extrapolation of established trends alone. The process of exploring 
potential disruptions allows us to identify specific, known sources of 
uncertainty, which can be used as the basis for developing alternative 
scenarios. In this case, disruptions are events that represent a sharp 
deviation from business as usual and have radical implications for 
jobs and skills. Our study explored 10 such disruptions, on the basis 
of their plausibility and the likely severity of their impact if they were 
to occur. In considering possible structural changes to the labour 
market that would impact on skills demand in particular, three of these 
disruptions are worth focussing on.
Alternative centres of excellence
As emerging countries develop the infrastructure, regulation 
and labour markets necessary to push them to the next level of 
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development, it is possible they could take global leadership of 
sectors and activities that are currently centred elsewhere. These 
countries benefit from a number of potential advantages which 
make them attractive to investors, including their potential as rapidly 
growing markets, support from interventionist governments and low 
labour costs. PwC, for instance, predicts that within 30 years the 
majority of the world’s largest industrial clusters will be located in 
markets that today we think of as ‘emerging’ (PwC 2010). This would 
have a massive impact on jobs and skills, and is considered to be a 
realistic or likely prospect.
Zero-hours contracts
Opinions differ about how widespread zero-hours contracts are 
currently.1 However, a key concern, should they become the norm, 
lies in their impact on individuals’ and businesses’ skills investment 
decisions. In this scenario, both employees and employers might 
feel less inclined to invest in training and development, which 
would have a serious negative effect on Europe’s ability to increase 
productivity levels.
Robotics and artificial intelligence
Some academics believe that such technologies could be used 
to automate huge swathes of existing jobs.2 This would extend 
beyond routine clerical jobs, which are already being displaced by 
technology at a significant rate, to include higher-level professional 
jobs, which hitherto have been a major source of employment 
growth. Although the European labour market has been creating 
sufficient jobs to offset the impact of technological change for at 
least two centuries, the projected rate of change in the future might 
mean this record cannot be sustained. 
Managing skills supply for tomorrow’s world of work
Although we cannot know the future, by exploring some of the 
possibilities our study has highlighted key areas of consideration 
for employers, individuals, education providers and policymakers in 
preparing for tomorrow’s world of work.
Individuals in the future will need to take greater responsibility 
for their own ongoing development, partly as a response to the 
changing nature of the employment relationship but also in order 
to maximise their personal agility in the labour market. In the face 
of limited investment from government and employers, individuals 
should take personal responsibility for acquiring and constantly 
updating skills for progression. 
1 See Matthew Whittaker in this volume for more on non-standard forms of 
employment.
2 See for example Frey and Osborne 2013.
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The growing importance of technology to the learning process 
itself will have to be recognised. Institutions should look to harness 
these technologies to respond to the diverse demands of students 
and workers, and develop flexible learning pathways that reflect the 
changing employment landscape. In turn, the impact of technology 
on how teaching and training is delivered will present individuals 
with new and different approaches to learning, which they should 
embrace. The boundaries of ‘specialist knowledge’ will become 
blurred, as technologies and disciplines converge in the constant 
search for innovation. Individuals should be willing and able to jump 
across specialist knowledge boundaries, and so to develop a blend 
of technical training and ‘softer’, collaborative skills.
Education and training provision should reflect the growing 
importance of interdisciplinary approaches to innovation and the 
influence of technology, and providers should collaborate closely 
with employers to support them in achieving their business 
needs. Individuals and employers will need to be able to work 
across different disciplines, to collaborate virtually, to demonstrate 
cultural sensitivity, and to respond to increasingly flexible working 
practices, as well as keeping up with the new skills that new 
technologies will demand.
Employers should look to collaborate on an industry-wide scale 
to overcome key skills challenges, fostering resilience and the 
capacity to innovate in the face of intensifying global competition. 
They should strengthen their collaboration with the education 
sector to ensure they can access critical skills. Employers should 
also develop their capability to manage skills and talent across 
global business networks and supply chains, as more open 
business models and more fluid employment arrangements will 
make this essential. 
In government, the complexity and the sheer rate of change are 
likely to make existing policy models obsolete, while constraints 
on public resources will limit the opportunity to invest directly. The 
challenge for government, therefore, will be to help to facilitate an 
employer-led ‘engine’ of skills development and to effectively align 
public and private investment around this.
We cannot specify exactly how the supply of skills to the European 
labour market needs to change in response to the shifts in demand 
that will be caused by structural changes, because we cannot 
know the future with any certainty. However, there are present 
trends – some of which may be accentuated in the future – which 
are already causing structural changes in the labour market, and 
which call for a response.
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1.6 
BEYOND THE HEADLINES: 
ANALYSING SKILLS DATA OVER 
THE LONG TERM
MICHAEL J HANDEL 
Northeastern University, Boston
It is commonly believed that the demand for skills at work is now 
or soon will be rising much more rapidly than in the past, and that 
the rapid diffusion of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) is a major reason for this current or anticipated change. This is 
often coupled with concern that the supply of skills is not keeping 
pace with demand, or at least will soon fall behind. However, despite 
these concerns being widespread, our understanding of skill trends, 
technology and their possible interrelationships remains rather vague, 
and seeking to address this reveals some significant conceptual and 
methodological challenges. Furthermore, the evidence that is available 
to address the issue suggests only a gradual trend towards greater 
skill requirements has occurred in most European economies since 
1950, with no recent acceleration.
The challenge of measuring skill supply and demand
Certainty regarding skill supply – the job-relevant skills possessed by 
the workforce and potential new entrants to the labour market – is 
limited by the shallowness of available measures. Typically, workers’ 
skills are measured by total years of schooling or highest education 
level attained. However, test scores can make finer distinctions within 
and between education groups, and highlight concerns about the 
true value of education levels as a proxy for skills. Other qualitative 
variations appear between diverse fields of study, academic and 
career-focussed, at the secondary and post-secondary levels. Test 
scores and field of study time-series data would provide much 
richer detail on trends in skill ‘stocks’ than schooling data alone, but 
these are scarce. Even less common is data on the various kinds of 
shorter-term training and informal learning that often provide the ICT 
skills and other specific competencies sought by employers.
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On the other side of the equation, measures of the skills required 
by jobs are still less common and less well-conceptualised.1 One 
useful approach is to divide job skill requirements into cognitive, 
interpersonal and physical demands, and to specify the contents of 
each domain. 
Cognitive demands are the focus of most attention, and studies 
indicate they are associated with the greatest rewards. This 
domain includes required level of education; particular general 
academic skills (such as levels of reading, writing and mathematical 
ability); general reasoning ability; specialist knowledge of varying 
complexity; ICT skills of different kinds and complexity; and the 
countless kinds of information, knowledge and skills that are 
specific to particular occupations and positions, and which can 
only be captured on a common scale by general measures, such 
as years of prior experience. The qualitative variation across 
sectors found in task lists is not easily translated into common, 
quantitative metrics, which means the measures usually cannot be 
used to produce a picture of overall employment. One prerequisite 
for measuring a possible mismatch between skills supply and 
demand with any specificity is to be able to gauge both workers’ 
skills and job skill requirements according to a common unit. It 
is straightforward to measure educational attainment and the 
educational requirements of a job in the same units, but progress 
has only just begun to be made with respect to some other 
cognitive skill dimensions, and such data is not plentiful.
Interpersonal job requirements can be elaborated in a similar fashion, 
but there is very little clarity on concepts and measures, weak 
evidence on the rewards of meeting these requirements, and even 
less progress in putting the measurement of workers’ skills and job 
demands on a common scale for effective comparison. Although 
it is generally accepted that the need for ‘people skills’, such as 
teamwork, communication and customer service, is growing rapidly 
and poses significant challenges in terms of workforce preparedness, 
the formal bases for this belief are relatively undeveloped.
Physical job demands can be divided into unskilled tasks, such 
as simple motions and physical exertion, whose relative decline is 
an index of progress, and skilled manual job tasks, like tool use in 
craft and repair work. For the most part, these tasks, and the skills 
needed to fulfil them, are easier to record, although their variability 
makes it difficult to bring them together into aggregate measures.
1 The following is drawn from Handel 2008 and Handel 2015.
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The influence of technological change on 
skills demand
Measuring the spread of ICT and its effects on job requirements 
presents its own challenges. ICT may increase job skill demands 
through several pathways, which are not mutually exclusive:
• ICT may alter the task content within occupations because:
 – the software and hardware are difficult to learn (computer-
specific human capital)
• ICT increases the weight of cognitive tasks relative to physical or 
less complex cognitive demands (general human capital).
• ICT may alter the distribution of workers across occupations 
because:
 – more skilled workers are needed to manage the technology 
itself (such as database administrators, network technicians 
and webmasters) or to analyse the information it generates (eg 
planners and big data analysts)
 – fewer lower-skilled workers are needed due to automation (eg 
manufacturing production workers, data-entry clerks and mail 
sorters)
 – more lower-skilled workers are needed due to the elimination 
of skilled workers (eg printing).
• ICT may alter the distribution of workers across industries with 
different skill profiles because it:
 – creates or expands product/service demand in relatively higher-
skilled sectors (such as software, IT services, video game 
production, social media and other dotcoms)
 – reduces demand in relatively lower-skilled sectors (eg 
postal services, book and music stores and fixed-line 
telecommunications)
 – increases demand in relatively lower-skilled sectors (eg app-
based taxi services and other digitally enabled microwork).
The data requirements for investigating these different mechanisms 
in a systematic fashion vary. In addition to the job content measures 
discussed already, we would need to be able to measure not only 
the prevalence and complexity of various kinds of software used 
by workers, but also the extent of various hardware systems that 
might be substituting for them. Time-series data for the shares 
of occupations in the workforce is available, but determining, for 
example, whether a drop in the number of production workers 
reflects automation or outsourcing is not always simple. Likewise, 
industry data is not always sufficiently detailed to identify subsectors 
of interest – in part, this reflects the relatively small size of many of 
the emerging businesses which attract so much attention on account 
of their novelty.
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This raises an important note of caution about the common practice 
of citing examples, as we have done in the list above. Classification 
schemes used in official statistics commonly recognise approximately 
500 detailed occupations and 200 detailed industries. This means 
that the average occupation accounts for 0.2 per cent of total 
employment and the average industry accounts for 0.5 per cent. Just 
as moving from broad hunches regarding skill trends to hard metrics 
is more complicated than might at first be imagined, moving from 
anecdote to data regarding their presumed technological drivers is 
complex. Visible novelty must generalise over a wide swath for its 
impacts to be significant. 
Assessing long-run trends
With these complexities in mind, we can examine some evidence for 
trends in direct measures of job skill requirements and occupational 
shares. The European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) provides 
trend data for a limited number of measures of cognitive, interpersonal 
and physical job demands, as well as computer use at work. These 
are shown in the following three tables.2 Although the cross-sectional 
patterns are largely consistent with expectations, there is remarkably 
little change over time.3
Moreover, these findings do not change in light of more recent figures 
from the 2010 survey wave, at least with respect to the critical 
cognitive skill dimension:
‘A fundamental aspect of developing in a job is having 
the opportunity to tackle cognitive challenges at work 
– for instance, learning new things, solving unforeseen 
problems on one’s own, or performing complex tasks. 
This is important both for workers’ own wellbeing, and for 
companies to ensure that they continually upgrade their 
in-house capacity to create and innovate. Broadly speaking, 
there has been no marked improvement over time in this 
respect.’
Eurofound 2010
It is notable in table 1.6.1 that workers are much less likely to say 
their job involves complex tasks than problem-solving or learning 
new things. For many jobs, problem-solving and learning may be 
at a sufficiently low level that they do not contribute much to job 
complexity. In any case, this ambiguity underscores the importance of 
using multiple items and the hazards of seeking concrete conclusions 
from very general questions. While the results for the 2015 wave of 
2 For more, see Handel 2012.
3 There are some exceptions, such as the surprising fall in the share of jobs in the UK 
requiring each of the three types of cognitive skill, which merits further examination.
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the EWCS may show a different picture, it would not be surprising, 
given previous trends, if they did not.
Table 1.6.2 indicates that computer use at work increased by slightly 
less than one percentage point per year between 1990 and 2005, 
but this seemed to have no impact on the cognitive skill measures in 
the prior table, or on the EWCS measure of interpersonal tasks in this 
table. This may be because the most common applications of ICT 
do not have steep learning requirements, which facilitates their mass 
diffusion. 
Table 1.6.3 indicates no strong trend in various measures of physical 
demands.
Table 1.6.1
Share of jobs involving cognitive demands, by skill type, 1995–2005 
(%)
Complex tasks Problem-solving Learning new things
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
EU15 59.6 60.3 59.2 80.0 81.1 78.2 74.5 71.6 67.0
Anglo-Saxon
Ireland 52.9 51.5 54.9 75.0 72.1 76.4 75.2 68.3 76.7
UK 71.1 63.4 58.5 89.9 82.6 78.9 81.9 77.0 71.4
Continental
Austria 74.2 76.8 77.8 78.1 78.4 77.3 74.3 69.6 71.7
Belgium 48.3 49.0 54.7 80.0 86.4 87.9 66.6 75.4 76.7
Germany 60.9 69.1 69.9 75.4 79.3 75.9 72.6 69.0 63.4
France 52.6 52.6 52.3 82.2 86.0 83.1 73.6 72.7 68.4
Luxembourg 60.2 53.5 63.6 77.6 74.3 85.0 73.4 76.2 75.0
Netherlands 63.3 62.3 62.6 91.7 93.9 93.7 80.5 80.2 82.4
Nordic
Denmark 61.0 63.8 76.1 90.8 92.3 94.2 84.2 86.1 88.2
Finland 67.9 72.1 72.6 85.9 77.4 79.0 90.0 90.8 89.9
Sweden 72.0 56.5 67.9 93.2 92.2 96.4 86.3 81.5 89.4
Southern Europe
Greece 46.1 46.4 54.0 67.0 62.7 68.7 52.1 48.6 63.0
Italy 46.5 40.6 46.2 73.8 73.9 72.4 74.3 70.3 68.2
Spain 37.6 41.0 39.3 84.2 81.2 77.9 62.0 63.9 60.0
Portugal 40.8 42.6 53.8 75.7 69.6 78.7 69.6 58.4 67.6 
Source: Author’s tabulations, in Handel 2012 
Notes: Figures indicate those responding ‘yes’ to questions on whether their main job 
involves ‘complex tasks’, ‘solving unforeseen problems on your own’ and ‘learning 
new things’. Wage and salary workers only. Figures use country- and year-specific 
post-stratification weights. EU15 totals adjust weights by the relative size of each 
country’s workforce for each year, derived from the European Labour Force Survey.
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Table 1.6.2
Share of jobs using computers and involving public contact, 
1990–2005 (%)
Computer use Public contact
1990 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
EU* 35.7 41.8 43.7 49.1 65.1 61.1 65.4
Anglo-Saxon
Ireland 37.8 39.1 47.0 53.4 70.9 62.6 71.6
UK 43.4 57.7 56.0 53.4 77.7 71.1 69.1
Continental
Austria 39.2 38.2 45.8 64.8 62.7 64.1
Belgium 33.8 39.5 48.1 63.0 61.0 63.5 63.4
Germany 33.7 39.6 39.8 49.4 59.7 54.7 62.9
France 35.1 35.5 42.1 46.9 70.7 65.0 67.2
Luxembourg 34.2 42.7 48.9 57.8 63.3 57.5 65.5
Netherlands 44.2 56.0 62.2 70.7 71.3 72.8 67.8
Nordic
Denmark 39.9 42.1 45.1 63.1 70.2 69.4 77.8
Finland 49.8 54.9 60.4 69.9 73.1 71.9
Sweden 49.2 49.7 72.1 79.1 73.8 78.0
Southern Europe
Greece 16.6 15.7 25.7 30.3 59.2 61.2 58.3
Italy 34.6 33.4 38.5 43.6 56.9 61.6 64.6
Spain 25.2 28.1 28.8 40.4 58.0 49.3 63.0
Portugal 22.7 26.8 29.1 34.9 55.2 41.0 60.8
Source: Author’s tabulations, in Handel 2012 
Notes: Figures indicate those saying they spend at least one-quarter of their time 
working with computers and dealing directly with people who are not employees at 
their workplace, such as customers, pupils and patients. Wage and salary workers 
only. Figures use country- and year-specific post-stratification weights. EU15 
totals adjust weights by the relative size of each country’s workforce for each year, 
derived from the European Labour Force Survey. 
* Only EU12 countries participated in the 1990 survey wave, but EU-wide averages 
in later years are not sensitive to exclusion of other countries.
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Table 1.6.3
Share of jobs involving physical and related job requirements, 
1990–2005 (%)
Table 1.6.3
Share of jobs involving physical and related job requirements, 1990–
2005
Heavy loads Machine paced Vibrations Repetitive motions Monotonous tasks
1990 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
EU* 15.4 18.7 23.1 18.9 22.5 22.1 18.5 24.0 23.6 21.4 44.2 43.5 49.2 45.4 39.3 42.5
Anglo-Saxon
Ire 17.0 17.1 20.0 17.2 27.0 26.0 12.7 20.4 22.3 16.0 39.8 46.9 41.7 58.4 51.7 45.2
UK 16.2 18.3 24.8 18.1 27.0 22.8 20.8 15.8 16.9 14.4 52.3 44.5 46.9 68.0 57.5 57.5
Continental
Bel 14.7 20.0 20.3 14.6 16.9 19.0 15.6 19.7 20.2 13.6 44.1 40.9 39.0 36.8 31.4 31.7
Ger 14.7 17.6 21.3 16.1 20.2 21.7 17.7 28.2 27.0 26.8 37.3 34.5 42.7 33.9 26.5 29.3
Fra 20.4 25.0 28.5 27.9 23.1 21.3 19.2 22.8 22.7 22.4 53.1 57.3 60.2 49.6 42.6 44.7
Lux 12.6 14.6 19.9 18.0 26.6 23.7 15.5 25.6 20.0 19.5 35.3 41.9 49.6 42.8 30.6 36.7
Ned 11.4 14.4 15.0 10.8 21.6 16.8 12.1 13.0 13.4 13.1 50.7 53.3 46.1 32.9 27.3 23.2
Aus 22.7 21.7 22.9 20.5 18.4 21.1 26.4 25.0 22.9 42.6 40.1 51.8 31.7 27.8 3.00
Nordic
Den 13.6 17.6 16.5 13.1 14.3 12.5 12.0 15.5 14.7 14.3 38.3 39.3 50.8 39.5 37.4 42.3
Fin 14.6 16.3 19.5 22.1 18.9 20.8 21.6 24.1 20.2 55.0 58.9 72.5 46.2 46.6 47.9
Swe 18.0 23.4 15.6 12.0 9.0 6.5 13.9 17.5 11.8 29.0 50.0 50.1 26.6 26.8 18.7
Southern Europe
Gre 18.6 19.8 23.9 27.1 28.8 22.3 18.7 32.0 24.9 28.7 62.2 57.7 69.8 63.2 53.2 57.5
Ita 8.2 12.8 15.4 12.5 24.4 22.7 17.7 20.5 24.7 18.2 43.8 42.7 53.4 48.0 36.2 43.5
Spa 18.8 21.7 29.9 24.1 25.2 29.0 17.6 30.0 32.4 19.5 54.2 62.8 55.4 63.5 60.7 64.2
Por 17.7 15.3 19.2 19.0 27.0 21.0 25.7 29.9 30.4 28.6 58.6 53.9 63.9 47.0 42.9 51.7
Source: Author’s tabulations, in Handel 2012 
Note: Figures indicate those saying they spend at least half of their time at work 
carrying or moving heavy loads and making repetitive hand or arm movements, at 
least one-quarter of their time ‘exposed to vibrations from hand tools, machinery, 
etc’ and who answered ‘yes’ to questions asking whether their work pace is 
‘dependent on the automatic speed of a machine or moving of a product’ and 
whether their job involved ‘monotonous tasks’ or not. Wage and salary workers 
only. Figures use country- and year-specific post-stratification weights. EU15 
totals adjust weights by the relative size of each country’s workforce for each year, 
derived from the European Labour Force Survey.  
* Only EU12 countries participated in the 1990 survey wave, but EU-wide averages 
in later years are not sensitive to exclusion of other countries.
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Needless to say, this data does not provide the final word on 
measuring job skill requirements, and continuing data limitations leave 
room for much uncertainty. Nonetheless, more traditional time series 
on occupational shares since 1950 or 1960 and other skill measures 
drawn from US databases and applied to European occupational time 
series since the early 1990s also show only gradual change in the 
expected directions.4 ICT may change the composition of employment 
and upgrade job skill requirements dramatically in some limited areas 
that receive a great deal of notice. However, it is also likely that the 
most high-profile cases project rather poorly onto the larger economy.
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572.1 Eichhorst
2.1 
FLEXIBILISATION, AND HOW 
GERMANY’S REFORMS 
SUCCEEDED
WERNER EICHHORST 
IZA
At the turn of the century, when searching for ways to overcome 
a protracted labour market crisis that involved large numbers of 
unemployed, a high proportion of long-term unemployment and 
levels of employment that were generally too low, Germany turned 
its attention to the experiences of other countries. This included 
the OECD’s employment strategy, which was underpinned by a 
comprehensive empirical analysis and favoured deregulation of labour 
markets as a way of increasing overall employment levels. Implicit in 
this strategy was the suggestion that the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approach of 
the United States and UK was an ideal model. These countries viewed 
less generous benefit systems and lower levels of protection against 
dismissal as going hand-in-hand with a more dynamic labour market.1
Nevertheless, no such US- or UK-inspired deregulation policies 
were implemented in Germany – or the majority of other continental 
European countries – in the years that followed. One of the main 
reasons was that this type of reform strategy was considered to 
be politically unacceptable; it was perceived by the public to be a 
system that fostered social inequality. Another reason was that the 
‘employment miracles’ taking place in the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Austria were attracting much more attention precisely because 
they were happening without massive deregulation. It was felt that 
a more generous benefits system was in fact compatible with a high 
level of employment, so long as appropriate steps were taken to 
ensure that jobseekers were actively looking for work, with the help 
of targeted labour market policies – an approach often referred to 
as ‘flexicurity’.
1 This is an updated summary of a study carried out for the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation, 2013, available at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_34465-544-2-30.
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The intensive labour market and welfare state reforms that Germany 
carried out in the first half of the 2000s owed a lot to these 
international models. However, the German version of reform was 
characterised by neither a full-blown liberal Anglo-Saxon model, nor 
a comprehensive flexicurity strategy. It was more a case of following 
a path that best suited the country’s own institutional conditions and 
political constellations. The German reforms were not pursued on the 
basis of some form of consensus with social partners, but as part of 
a clear initiative by the red/green federal government of the time.2 The 
labour market reforms, typified by the ‘Hartz reforms’ of 2002–05 and 
‘Agenda 2010’, were largely a collection of more-or-less compatible 
individual measures designed to address specific problem areas.3
They are deemed to have been successful largely due to the 
performance of the German labour market in the period since the 
financial crisis. While almost every other country in Europe saw 
unemployment increase in the recession that followed the crisis and 
has struggled to reduce it subsequently, unemployment continued to 
fall in Germany and is lower now than in 2007 (Eurostat A).
Creating an ‘activating’ welfare state
The importance of putting specific limitations on benefit payments 
cannot be overestimated, in terms of the activation policy that was 
applied to unemployment benefits in Germany. This is especially true 
of the following actions:
• shortening the period during which unemployment benefits can 
be claimed by older workers
• combining means-tested and earnings-related unemployment 
benefits and social welfare payments as a means of providing 
basic security to jobseekers of working age, but at social 
welfare levels
• instituting a stricter formulation and implementation of the 
demands placed on those receiving benefits, such as a duty to 
accept job offers and active labour market policy initiatives.
In this way, the German strategy of trying to ‘activate’ the 
unemployed utilises a combination of carrot and stick elements 
aimed at shortening, where possible, the length of time a person 
remains without work. A package of more comprehensive but 
also more flexible measures was put together for the long-term 
unemployed that could be adapted to the needs of the individual. 
Support for jobseekers was also intensified and the employment 
services given a thorough overhaul. As part of the Hartz reforms, 
many labour market policy instruments were amended to make 
2 A coalition of the Social Democratic party (SPD) and Alliance 90/Greens.
3 For more details of the Hartz reforms see Jacobi and Kluve 2006.
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them more effective in helping people to assimilate more quickly 
into the labour market. For example, long-established retraining 
programmes were replaced by shorter courses. 
In all this, Germany was following the example of other countries. 
The basic principles of labour market and welfare policies designed 
to ‘activate’ the unemployed, included stricter monitoring of 
their attempts to find work and imposition of stronger sanctions; 
the creation of a common point of contact for all (long-term) 
unemployed; the increased mobilisation of those responsible for 
implementing labour market policies; the agreement of targets 
and financial incentives; and the modernisation of the federal 
employment agency. 
Making the labour market more flexible
In order at the same time to improve the capacity of the labour 
market, the Hartz reforms included greater liberalisation of 
flexible working arrangements, or so-called ‘atypical’ jobs. This 
predominantly had an impact on temporary employment, ‘mini-jobs’ 
and self-employment, without significant changes being made to 
permanent employment or to existing protection against dismissal 
for those in permanent employment.
Temporary employment
Temporary employment was significantly liberalised as part of the 
Hartz reforms, leading to a massive growth in employment in this 
area. Some restrictions were lifted, such as the ban on synchronising 
and setting fixed terms for employment contracts and allocation to 
temporary staff agencies and the upper time limit for hiring staff. At 
the same time, the principle of equal treatment for temporary and 
permanent staff was established – although exceptions could be 
made when recruiting unemployed people or in the case of collective 
bargaining agreements. 
The consequence of this was that, for the first time, the temporary 
employment sector was covered by collective bargaining agreements 
between employer associations and unions. However, in those 
sectors that tended to employ the most temporary staff, pay scales 
could be significantly lower than those set out in the collective 
bargaining agreements already in place. This created an incentive for 
the industrial sector to shift some of its activities over to flexible and 
less well-paid workers. 
The role of temporary employment in helping to better assimilate 
the unemployed into the labour market – one of the original goals 
of the Hartz reforms – also changed. While the expectation that the 
long-term unemployed in particular would get an opportunity to enter 
the labour market has been largely fulfilled, there has been limited 
IPPR  |  Technology, globalisation and the future of work in Europe60
success in turning these opportunities into regular jobs. Temporary 
staff are being used by many sectors as a way of creating long-term 
flexibility and reducing overall staff costs, rather than as a way of 
recruiting permanent staff. Based on what we know today, there is 
little evidence that temporary work is providing a ‘wide bridge’ to 
more permanent working arrangements.
Part-time work and mini-jobs
Mini-jobs existed in Germany long before the advent of the Hartz 
reforms. However, they became more widespread from 2003 
onwards as a result of certain crucial changes. The earnings limit 
for a job that was exempt from contributions and taxes – which is 
now known as a mini-job – was raised to €400 per month. At the 
same time, the restrictions on taking such a job to supplement 
one’s income – put in place at the end of the 1990s – were lifted. 
The upper time limit for these jobs was also removed, so that longer 
working hours and lower pay became a possibility for this segment 
of the workforce. Since then, mini-jobs have become increasingly 
popular in specific sectors, such as retail and hospitality, because 
they are both flexible and relatively cheap for the employer. The 
exemption from tax means that people taking these jobs generally 
earn lower wages and often face significant obstacles when it 
comes to securing more hours.
The expansion of mini-jobs has had a significant impact on the job 
structures of many cost-sensitive areas of the service sector, such 
as retail trade, commercial cleaning and the hospitality business. 
Mini-jobs were designed as an instrument to create flexible and 
low-cost part-time working arrangements. However, the price 
paid for this move was an expanded low-pay sector and reduced 
progression opportunities. The initiative also failed to move jobs out 
of the informal economy into the official economy.
Self-employment
Another area of the German reforms was aimed at promoting 
self-employment. Liberalisation and the introduction of various 
measures were intended to make it easier for both the unemployed 
and those already in jobs to become self-employed. Existing 
obstacles to self-employment were lifted. In many trades it became 
possible to run a business without a master craftsman’s diploma, 
while in other areas there was a relaxation of the strict definition 
of self-employment that distinguishes it from paid employment. 
The opportunities for fixed-term employment contracts were also 
expanded for newly formed companies. Finally, huge incentives 
were given to the unemployed to take up self-employed work. This 
took the shape of new support for people to start businesses, as 
part of the Ich-AG initiative, which was later assessed as being 
particularly effective and relatively cheap.
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Fixed-term contracts and protection against dismissal
The same approach applied to the employment of older workers 
on fixed-term contracts, which has also become much easier since 
the mid-2000s. Since 2000, the legality of fixed-term contracts 
has not changed and these types of contracts have actually grown 
in importance. Reforms in 2000 limited the maximum total period 
of repeated fixed-term contracts with the same employer without 
specific reason to two years. However, there have been no further 
changes to the protection provided under employment law. The 
last reform, which came into effect in early 2004, simply raised the 
threshold for applying the protection against dismissal laws from five 
employees to 10, simplified the social criteria for redundancy, and 
introduced the option of a severance payment.
Modern collective bargaining policies and internal flexibility
However, labour market reforms are only one of the factors that 
explain the reduction in unemployment and the increase in the 
number of people employed in Germany. Apart from the changes in 
legislation, an important factor was the increased flexibility of standard 
employment terms and conditions. This longer-term adaptation of 
standard employment contracts has contributed significantly to the 
stabilisation, after an earlier period of contraction, of the number of 
people working in permanent employment. 
There are a number of reasons underpinning the significant changes 
seen in the collective bargaining landscape since the mid-1990s, 
including the declining competitiveness of German businesses, the 
relocation of businesses and jobs abroad, and an ever-increasing 
unwillingness on the part of companies to become members of 
employers’ associations. When it comes to collective bargaining 
agreements, changes have been made in some sectors, such as the 
metal and electrical industries, to allow for adaptations and deviations 
from agreed standards via special clauses. This created more flexibility 
for businesses in terms of pay and working hours. For their part, the 
unions and workers’ councils within companies were prepared to 
make concessions in order to safeguard jobs in the predominantly 
unionised core workforces. This heralded the beginning of a long 
period of wage restraint from the mid-1990s onwards, which in the 
medium term, thanks to lower unit labour costs, led to an increase in 
the competitiveness of Germany’s export-oriented industries.
This growing acceptance of greater flexibility in wages and working 
hours within those sectors covered by collective bargaining 
agreements was further enhanced by companies undertaking internal 
restructuring. This helped to stabilise employment numbers in the 
industrial sector and even allowed them to increase slightly, thanks to 
the positive trend in German exports. However, it should be pointed 
out that the number of workers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements has actually declined. 
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The outlook for Germany’s labour market
Germany’s successes in employment policy cannot be attributed to 
government labour market reforms alone. Rather, they are also the 
result of changes in the relationship between the parties to collective 
bargaining agreements and broader, more long-term developments 
within the private sector. However, the increase in employment over 
the last decade has been associated with wider dispersion of working 
conditions, in terms of wages and employment types. This, against 
a backdrop of lower unemployment in recent years, has motivated 
calls for a stricter regulation, for example with respect to temporary 
agency work, and the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in 
2015. Further changes will no doubt be required as Germany’s labour 
market shifts and adapts to changes in wider economic conditions 
nationally and across the region.
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2.2 
UNPICKING THE GERMAN 
JOBS MIRACLE: IS GERMANY 
A LABOUR MARKET ROLE 
MODEL?
MICHAEL FISCHER AND JÖRG BERGSTERMANN 
United Services Union and Freidrich Ebert Stiftung
Before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, Germany was often 
regarded as the ‘sick man of Europe’, with sluggish economic growth 
and a relatively high level of unemployment. Germany’s economy 
seemed hardly prepared for the challenges of the new millennium. 
But this view has changed fundamentally in recent years. While many 
European countries experienced a serious economic decline, sluggish 
recovery and soaring unemployment, Germany’s economic recovery 
from recession started quickly and its labour market seemed to 
experience almost no lasting hangover. On the contrary, unemployment 
fell further and Germany’s exports and trade surpluses broke one record 
after another, which many experts and politicians took as an indication 
not only of outstanding competitiveness but also of a fundamentally 
healthy economy. Much of this strong performance has been attributed 
to the structural reforms of the ‘Agenda 2010’ programme, a set of 
policies adopted since 2003 to make the labour market more flexible, 
to deregulate temporary work (Leiharbeit) and to restrict employment 
benefits.1 Now such measures are also being recommended to other 
countries in a state of economic crisis.
Examining ‘the jobs miracle’
This popular view of Germany’s economic and employment 
performance suggests labour market reform has been the essential 
element in preparing the country for wider challenges. But the 
country’s crisis management strategy was about more than labour 
market flexibility. Also important were the effects of automatic 
stabilisers, collaborative efforts within a (still relatively well-established 
1 See Werner Eichhorst in this volume for more on Germany’s reforms during this 
period.
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but pressurised) system of social partnership, and a successful 
business cycle policy. 
Furthermore, the reforms have produced some negative effects. For 
more than a decade, Germany has found itself on a trajectory of 
polarisation – in fact, a double polarisation. While a polarised labour 
market – in terms of high and low-skilled jobs – has started to take root, 
it is also possible to observe an increasing polarisation of economic 
sectors, which is creating significant internal and external imbalances.
Persistently high trade surpluses indicate a lack of domestic demand. 
One reason for this is unequal wage developments in export industries 
on the one hand and in the more domestically oriented service sector 
on the other. By 2011, average hourly income in the private service 
sector was almost 20 per cent lower than in the manufacturing sector 
(Stein et al 2012). One result is that many low-wage earners in the 
service sector are dependent on government assistance to sustain 
a decent standard of living. In addition, low hourly wages often go 
alongside insecure working models. Temporary work – a marginal 
phenomenon in Germany 10 years ago – now accounts for about 
1 million jobs. Part-time working has also increased. The structural 
reforms of ‘Agenda 2010’ might have put more people into work, but 
overall working hours have almost stagnated. Employment has not 
grown but is distributed among more people, including more part-time 
workers and so-called ‘mini-jobbers’ (Dauderstädt 2013).
These developments also exert pressure on the established dual 
system of vocational education and training, which is widely seen as 
creating a culture of skilled labour (Facharbeiterkultur) and is often said 
to be one of the main reasons for Germany having one of the lowest 
levels of youth unemployment in Europe. The annual education report 
of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) regularly finds 
that about one-third of young people searching for an apprenticeship 
position do not succeed in finding one, that the number of firms 
offering such positions is declining, and that recently in certain sectors 
– in commerce, retailing, the food service industry and crafts – the 
quality of education and training has diminished significantly, leading 
to high dropout rates of up to 50 per cent (DGB Jugend 2014). At 
the same time, though, not all firms are able to fill their apprenticeship 
schemes, suggesting there is something of a mismatch between the 
aspirations of young people and the needs of employers.
This suggests German economic and labour policies have enabled 
many businesses to follow a ‘low-road’ strategy of cost-cutting 
(including wage-dumping) instead of a ‘high-road’ strategy of 
investing in high-quality education, innovation and productivity 
gains. Although the starting point for this change was an economy 
that already exhibited a comparatively high level of quality of 
work, products and services, and although there have been some 
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countervailing measures – such as a statutory minimum wage and the 
reregulation of temporary work and contract labour – the downward 
trend in job quality is nonetheless now well-established. This can 
also be seen in more recent developments, particularly employers’ 
reactions to a new wave of digitisation and digital interconnectedness.
Changes in the workplace, for the many and the few
For an increasing number of knowledge workers, the dissolution 
of boundaries between work and leisure time is already a reality. 
Equipped with laptops and smartphones, they can work at home 
or in a café almost as well as they can in a traditional office – 
and increasingly often they do (Schwemmle and Wedde 2012). 
This facilitates new liberties and opportunities to reconcile work 
requirements with personal and family circumstances, but it also 
brings with it the danger of transforming the opportunity to work 
anywhere and anytime into the duty to work everywhere and always – 
a risk that is confirmed by trade union surveys (see DGB 2014).
New processes and technologies mean that knowledge-intensive 
services, like financial advice or employment services, are 
experiencing a major restructuring. As algorithms become the basis 
for operational decision-making, whole new divisions of tasks are 
created, simultaneously devaluing the skills of many employees and 
valorising those of the few who design and refine these processes. 
In commerce, retail and logistics, digitalised and automated 
merchandise planning and control systems are being tested which 
reduce the demand for routine work and labour in general, but 
increase the need for the remaining employees to have higher-level 
skills in complex problem-solving (to resolve unexpected glitches 
in the new systems). Previously comprehensive company value 
chains are being split into two, with core businesses and staff on 
one side and peripheral contractors on the other. More sophisticated 
benchmarking systems aim to further increase efficiency and 
externalise costs, demanding ever-higher commitments from regular 
employees and at lower levels of compensation, while an increased 
use of contracted labour is fostering a cadre of the ‘quasi self-
employed’, reducing security for these individuals and generating 
even greater inequality among staff who are fulfilling identical tasks.
Similar trends can also be seen in sectors where, due to Germany’s 
ageing population, employment is widely projected to grow in the 
future. Personal services in health and care are already suffering from 
an increasing lack of good jobs and decent work. Strong driving 
factors here include institutional and financial restrictions imposed by 
the health insurance system and the ideology of ‘lean government’, 
which sees public services primarily as ‘cost factors’. Here, wage 
competition is becoming dominant, driven both by liberalisation and 
deregulation (Bräutigam et al 2014).
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These emerging trends in the German world of work point to a 
scenario in which the mid-level qualifications and skills needed for 
routine cognitive and manual tasks become less valuable, while 
high-skilled employees with analytical, creative, communication 
and interpersonal talents can improve their material bargaining 
position (although not necessarily with regard to control over their 
own free time), and prospects for the long-term unemployed are 
poor, and may well deteriorate further. It is already the case that 
high-quality education and vocational training are the sine qua non 
for an individual’s sustainable economic participation. However, the 
time has gone when a formal degree (even a European-style dual 
vocational training or an academic degree) is any guarantee of decent 
and decently paid work – let alone a stable job. Addressing these 
challenges and pushing for economic development benefitting the 
majority requires not only a focus on individual skills and qualifications 
but a more comprehensive perspective on the conditions of 
employment in their entirety.
‘The humanisation of work’: identifying progressive 
policy options
Maintaining a firm’s competitiveness is probably the most 
common justification given for changing job specifications, 
making redundancies or devising new roles. However, whether 
that firm pursues a low-road or high-road approach in its quest 
for competitiveness makes a huge difference in terms of the 
consequences for its workers. In recent years, Germany’s 
competitiveness model seems to have focussed primarily on reducing 
costs, particularly with regard to the cost of labour, including social 
security costs (Lohnnebenkosten) and labour rights. If increases in 
hourly labour productivity are the key to prosperity in the long term, 
then the performance of Germany’s economy since the beginning 
of the new millennium is worrying – indeed, it is below average, 
compared to similar developed economies like those of France, 
Sweden or the US (Van Ark et al 2009).
Instead, it is time for a greater focus on high productivity and 
quality jobs, promoting ‘good work’ for the benefit of the majority. 
There needs to be regulation to ensure that social and employment 
standards do not become mere ‘adjustment variables’ in the 
competition between firms (see Degryse et al 2013). The foremost 
requirement is to counteract the trends towards informal working and 
precarious work. In the German context, this means restricting mini-
jobs, ensuring equal pay and fair conditions for temporary contract 
workers, and protecting and expanding the prospects for this group 
to negotiate collective agreements.
In those sectors where technological progress in the form of 
digitisation and digital interconnectedness has already blurred the 
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boundaries between work and leisure, the issue of ‘time sovereignty’ 
looms largest, alongside struggles over workload and labour 
intensity (see Meine 2015). Once the question of hourly minimum 
wages has been addressed, it is likely that performance policy 
(Leistungspolitik, or ‘power politics’) will be one of the major new 
areas of contention, as well as the extension of shared employer-
employee decision-making to a wider range of operational and even 
managerial decisions, as seems advisable for both normative and 
technical reasons (see Roth and Muller 2015).
One of the most important lessons to be learned from Germany’s 
performance in the early stages of the economic crisis, when 
demand for many German products was falling, centres on labour 
market flexibility, in a broader sense than is traditionally meant. 
What enabled Germany to weather the storm better than most, in 
terms of employment levels, and to fare well in the recovery were a 
number of mechanisms that effectively acted as a buffer between 
the labour market and fluctuations in the demand for goods and 
services. These included public subsidies to the wage bills of 
companies most severely affected and existing collective agreements 
between the social partners. However, these mechanisms protected 
core employees better than those in peripheral jobs. Increasing 
uncertainty and instability in business and work has reinvigorated 
a debate among German social democrats and trade unionists the 
need for a new kind of ‘labour insurance’ (Arbeitsversicherung) to 
protect workers against unemployment, provide periods of advanced 
training, and facilitate switches between employment and self-
employment (see Rahner 2014).
Digitisation, digital interconnectedness, automatisation and robotics 
continue to increase the relative demand for ‘non-routine’ abilities 
– including analytical, creative, problem-solving, interpersonal and 
communication skills – meaning life-long learning becomes more 
and more important. An increasingly flexible workforce, constantly 
pushed to its limits, is unlikely to provide the advanced training that 
an individual needs over their (possibly prolonged) working life. As 
a response, any ‘performance policy’ has to be accompanied by 
improvements in advanced vocational training, and so universities 
– including universities of applied sciences and comprehensive 
universities – should be made more accessible not only for initial 
training but also for ongoing and advanced professional training. 
Future labour market trends are likely to demand a shift in workers’ 
focus from workplaces and related skill-requirements to their own 
working lives and ‘employment biographies’ – in other words, a 
rethinking of what a ‘career path’ means (see IG Metall 2014).
In many areas it is already clear what has to be done. Other questions 
are more open, including what can be considered a sustainable 
‘normal workload’ with regard to the processing of information and 
how a new model of ‘standard employment’ could be designed 
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and socially secured, given the increasing diversity of lifestyles and 
organisational and technological possibilities. The time is, therefore, 
ripe for a modern programme for the humanisation of work, which 
should take into account not only the situation and developments in 
Germany, but in Europe as a whole.
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2.3 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
IN THE GERMAN LABOUR 
MARKET
DAVID BRADY, THOMAS BIEGERT AND SIGURT VITOLS 
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
The German labour market has long been admired for its robust 
institutions, its vocational training and apprenticeship systems, 
which produce skilled and productive workers, and its relatively 
strong performance in delivering stable and secure careers. 
However, Germany has experienced a variety of economic, 
political, policy and institutional transformations in recent years 
and, as a result, its labour market has undergone many changes. 
This chapter offers an analysis of the contemporary German 
labour market, and how it changed between 1984 and 2010. 
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel made 
available through the Luxembourg Income Study, we analyse five 
labour market outcomes and a series of sociodemographic and 
employment-related variables.
The analysis reveals a number of important descriptive trends. 
The only improving trend is in the rise of the employment rate 
among working-age adults. On the other hand, some labour 
market outcomes – in particular, part-time employment and 
the share of low-wage employment – have grown much worse. 
There has also been a large increase in wage and earnings 
inequality. These changes have occurred at the same time as 
women’s labour force participation has increased; migrants 
have remained a relatively stable share of employees; and there 
have been substantial improvements in the education and skill 
composition of the labour force. 
There are also clear and relatively stable regional differences 
within Germany. In general, the former states of eastern 
German perform worse on nearly all labour market outcomes, 
and the southern states (especially Baden-Württemberg) 
perform best.
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The current German labour market
Generally, the relationships between sociodemographic variables 
and labour market outcomes are unsurprising, but there are 
some that are not in line with expectations. Across four out of five 
measured labour market outcomes, women are disadvantaged 
relative to men, even after allowing for any differences in other 
variables (such as age, education levels and experience). The one 
exception is that women are not more likely to be on temporary 
contracts than men. The other four are employment, part-time and 
temporary working, low-wage working and wage growth.
People born outside Germany are significantly less likely to be 
employed, but are also significantly less likely to be in part-time 
employment, and significantly less likely to be low-wage workers. 
Having a young child in the household is significantly negatively 
associated with employment, and significantly positively associated 
with part-time and low-wage employment. 
Young adults (aged 18–24) experience some advantages and 
disadvantages. They are more likely to be employed and less 
likely to be working part-time. However, they are more likely to be 
temporarily employed and more likely to be low-wage employees.
People with few or no qualifications are significantly less likely 
to be employed and more likely to have low hourly wages if they 
are in work. However, they are also significantly less likely to be 
part-time employees and not significantly different in terms of 
temporary and low-wage employment. Labour market outcomes 
are better for those with vocational training experience than for 
those with medium-level qualifications but without vocational 
training. Those with higher education have the best labour market 
outcomes across all five outcomes.
Trends in the labour market
Over time, there have been some important changes to how 
the sociodemographic and employment-related variables are 
associated with labour market outcomes. Our analysis shows 
women have become more likely to work, but have experienced 
a slightly increased disadvantage in terms of part-time and low-
wage employment. At the same time, young adults have become 
increasingly less likely to be employed. 
We also find that those with vocational training or higher levels of 
education have becoming increasingly advantaged. Comparing 2010 
with 1984, there appear to be increasing returns to education and 
training. While there have always been advantages to education and 
training, workers with a low or medium level of education and no 
vocational training have become increasingly disadvantaged.
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Most other key predictors have had relatively stable effects over time. 
There has been no clear change in the effects of being born outside 
Germany, age, industry or occupation on labour market outcomes. 
Even for young workers, there are no major changes over time in 
four of the five labour market outcomes. Moreover, we do not find 
fundamental changes in the traditionally successful domains of the 
German labour market, namely manufacturing and skilled workers.
Addressing three contemporary issues
This analysis can inform the debates around three contemporary 
issues in the German labour market: the effect of policy reform, the 
growth of precarious work and the tendency towards dualisation.
We have data for 2004 and 2007, immediately before and soon after 
the Hartz reforms to the German labour market were implemented, 
which allows us to gauge the effects of these reforms. The Hartz 
reforms coincided with rising employment, and there was not a clear 
increase in temporary employment between 2004 and 2010.1 Also, 
hourly wages rose between 2004 and 2010. However, since the 
reforms came into effect, there has been a clear increase in low-wage 
employment and wage and earnings inequality.
Consistent with the work–family aspect of the reforms, women were 
more likely to be working in 2010 than in earlier decades. There 
has also been an increase in part-time employment, which the 
reforms guaranteed as a right. However, women experience growing 
disadvantages relative to men in other labour market outcomes. 
Although there has not been a rise in part-time employment overall, 
women are increasingly more likely to be working part-time, which 
suggests strong – and potentially growing – gender segregation. 
There is also a clear disadvantage for women to having a young child 
in the household: work–family policies enable employment but have 
not gone far enough to remove disadvantages to parenting, a burden 
that falls disproportionately on women. While the policy changes 
provide state- and employer-funded benefits for working families, 
employers have not become less discriminating against women and 
mothers. The rising disadvantages that employed women experience 
are consistent with at least some increase in discrimination.
A second major narrative in discussion of the German labour market 
has been the growth in precarious working. More specifically, there is 
a view that deregulation, increased business power and weakening 
labour market institutions, social policies and unions have all worsened 
the standing of workers.
1 It is important to be cautious with the 2010 time point as falls squarely within the 
‘Great Recession’. However, as this analysis concentrates primarily on longer-term 
trends, our conclusions do not rest solely on the 2010 data.
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There is some evidence for a prevailing trend towards precarious-
ness. Unionisation has declined precipitously in Germany; young 
adults are having greater difficulty finding employment; and the 
rise in part-time employment is not encouraging, even if it reflects 
work–family reconciliation and some degree of personal choice. 
More importantly, there have been significant increases in low-wage 
employment and in wage and earnings inequality. On the other hand, 
it is difficult to decisively conclude that the labour market is getting 
more precarious when employment and hourly wages are increasing 
significantly. Moreover, there is a lot of stability and continuity in 
labour market outcomes.
The third narrative centres on dualisation, and contends that the 
labour market is being increasingly divided into ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’, who are granted different levels of access to labour 
markets, institutions and social policies. While the German labour 
market might benefit older, male, native workers, it excludes and 
marginalises the young, women, the less skilled and immigrants. 
Indeed, the argument has been that the exclusion of such groups is 
what has allowed the German system to maintain generous wages, 
benefits, protections, and social policies for the insiders – especially in 
an era of financial austerity and following reunification.
The strongest evidence for dualisation is the significant increases 
in part-time employment, low-wage work and wage and earnings 
inequality. Particularly indicative of dualisation are the increasing 
disadvantages that employed women experience, and the fact that 
young adults have become increasingly less likely to be employed. 
Equally relevant are the persistent advantages of skilled workers: 
those with vocational training, and those in the public sector or 
mining/manufacturing industries. That Germany’s traditionally 
successful workers are clearly insiders and continue to be ‘winners’ 
means that the outsiders and ‘losers’ include the less skilled, and 
those without vocational training working in the service sector. 
Workers with low- or medium-level qualifications and no vocational 
training have become increasingly disadvantaged. Meanwhile, the 
German labour market has substantially improved for those with a 
university education. That this improvement has coincided with rising 
low-wage employment and inequality suggests that many workers are 
excluded and marginalised.
However, some evidence is more ambiguous. Migrants are 
disadvantaged, but this disadvantage has not increased over the 
period when dualisation was supposedly becoming more pronounced. 
Although women face increasing disadvantages in the labour market, 
more women have been able to work than in the past, which makes 
it hard to see them, as a group, as outsiders. Temporary employment 
has not increased. Against four of the five labour market outcomes, 
young workers are not doing any worse in 2010 than they were in 
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1984. Finally, the key institutions of education and training, which 
might be supposed to sort workers into insiders and outsiders, have 
arguably become less exclusive over time.
Overall, there is some evidence to support each of these three 
narratives about the German labour market, but in no case it is over-
whelming. The concept of dualisation arguably best describes the 
changes in the German labour market, but at the same time one 
should keep in mind the stability and robustness of the German model.
That said, despite an increase in the average skill level of the German 
workforce, there has been an increase in part-time work, in low-wage 
employment and in wage inequality. This is the downside of increased 
labour market flexibility. At the margin, firms appear to have taken a 
‘low road’ to more low-productivity, low-value-added, low-paid work, 
rather than a ‘high road’ characterised by the opposite. The lesson for 
Germany – and for other European countries – is that simply supplying 
skills to a flexible labour market is not by itself an adequate response 
to structural change in the economy. More needs to be done to 
encourage and support firms to move towards a high-productivity 
model so that they can offer more, better-quality jobs.
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3.1 
BRIDGING THE SKILLS GAP
THOR BERGER AND CARL BENEDIKT FREY 
Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford & 
Department of Economic History, Lund University
In recent decades, European labour markets have witnessed substantial 
disruption as the workplace has been restructured to accommodate the 
arrival of digital technologies. Since the 1980s, these technologies have 
substituted for many routine jobs, particularly those involving rule-based 
activities, which can easily be specified in computer code. By contrast, 
newly created jobs have typically become more cognitive in nature, 
raising the demand for workers with problem-solving, creative and social 
skills. Looking forward, the digitisation of the economy will further alter 
the skills needed at work. A key challenge for governments around 
Europe is to help workers who are made redundant to transition into 
new types of jobs.
The expanding scope of automation
In the past, automation was largely confined to middle-income 
routine manufacturing and clerking occupations, but things are 
changing. Now, technological advances are likely to increase 
the pressure on workers at the lower end of the skill distribution. 
As the scope of automation expands rapidly to include a wide 
range of unstructured or non-routine tasks, many of the old 
‘safe havens’ for low-skilled workers are likely to disappear. The 
prospect of driverless cars proves the feasibility of automating 
many occupations in the transport and logistics sector; 
increasingly sophisticated algorithms for big data make it feasible 
to computerise many office and administration jobs; and recent 
advances in the sensing capabilities of robots may enable the 
substitution of labour across a swathe of service occupations.
Against the background of such technological breakthroughs, a study 
by one of the authors (Carl Benedikt Frey) and Michael Osborne 
predicts that 47 per cent of US jobs are at ‘high risk’ of being 
automated within the next decade or two (Frey and Osborne 2013). 
In particular, workers in transportation and logistics, as well as a wide 
range of production, office and administrative support workers, are at 
risk of being replaced by computer-controlled equipment. PA
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Bruegel, a European thinktank, applied these estimates to 
employment data for the EU28, showing that a similar share of 
European jobs is at risk. Their estimates show that countries such as 
Belgium, Germany and Sweden have a similar exposure to the US, 
but they also suggest that countries in the European periphery are 
likely to see more substantial job losses in the near future, reflecting 
their higher share of low-skilled work (Bowles 2014). Although 
relative costs matter, which means that the substitution of labour 
in low-wage countries may take some time, the consequences for 
countries with less extensive social security systems are potentially 
even more disruptive. In coming decades, anywhere from 45 
per cent to well over 60 per cent of European workers could see 
themselves displaced due to computerisation. With some 24 million 
of Europe’s workers currently unemployed (Eurostat A), these 
predictions suggest daunting labour market challenges ahead.
Challenges for low-skilled workers
As the scope of workplace automation expands, workers will have to 
find other types of jobs that are less amenable to computerisation. In 
the same way that workers have adapted to technological upheaval 
in the past by developing skills that are complementary to new 
technologies, so the workers of the future will have to adapt as well. 
The crucial question, then, is what skills they will have to acquire.
According to a survey carried out by the European Centre for 
the Development of Vocational Training in Germany, Hungary, 
the Netherlands and Finland, some 25 per cent of workers will 
experience skill obsolescence, and 16 per cent of workers believe 
that technological advances have made their skills obsolete within 
the last two years (Cedefop 2012). The skill-sets identified as most 
critical are the ability to speak other languages and computer and 
ICT skills. Skill obsolescence is particularly evident among low-skilled 
workers, exacerbating the increased susceptibility to automation in 
many such jobs. According to the same study, about one in three 
low-skilled workers also experience a lack of skill development in 
their careers, suggesting that directed efforts will be needed to help 
displaced low-skilled workers transition into new types of work.
Furthermore, as digital technology becomes more heavily integrated 
into the daily operations of firms across a wide range of industries, 
digital literacy will become critically important for the vast majority of 
workers. Yet, according to the European Commission, some 47 per 
cent of European workers have insufficient digital skills, with 23 per 
cent having none at all. Moreover, large differences exist between 
countries: in Sweden, just 6 per cent of the population has no 
digital skills, whereas every second Romanian lacks them (European 
Commission 2014). At the same time, the demand for workers with 
ICT skills grows by about 4 per cent annually, which could result in 
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as many as 900,000 vacancies in ICT jobs by 2020 (ibid), pointing 
to substantial challenges for policymakers in promoting the broad 
development of digital skills in Europe.
To bridge the skills gap, the educational system should be aligned 
to provide students with basic digital and ICT skills. Such initiatives 
are currently being undertaken in several European countries. 
In 2014, British schools, for example, introduced coding as part 
of the curriculum for children aged five and above. This involves 
learning about algorithms, how to code simple programs and logical 
reasoning. Integrating digital skills in the curriculum early on will 
be crucial for maintaining a competitive labour force in the future, 
something that has been recognised by the launch of the European 
Commission’s Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs, which emphasises 
the need for embedding basic ICT training throughout the European 
educational system. 
Yet, a narrow focus on digital skills will not be enough. As 
technology races ahead, the digital skills of today are likely to be 
obsolete sooner than we may think. More broadly, educational 
efforts should aim to provide workers with integrated skill-sets of 
technical, creative and social skills – that is, in areas where human 
workers are likely to retain a comparative advantage despite the 
inroads which have been or will be made by computers. Historically, 
great innovations have come from people who have successfully 
combined technical know-how with creativity, which suggests that 
building bridges between technology and the arts might also prove 
crucial for future competitiveness. 
Skills in the future of work
Jobs that are not at risk of computerisation have something in 
common: they require an understanding of human heuristics or 
involve the creation of novel ideas – that is, they require social 
or creative skills. Many jobs in management, education or 
healthcare that involve social interaction, therefore, are unlikely to 
be automated. Similarly, science or engineering jobs that require 
creative skills will probably not see substantial job losses due to 
technological advances in the near future.
Beyond simple job security, creative and entrepreneurial skills are 
also critical in identifying and exploiting economic opportunities in 
the digital age. Consider, for example, the rise of the app industry, 
created in the wake of Apple’s introduction of the iTunes store in 
2008. Research from the European Commission’s digital unit shows 
app developers could quadruple their earnings, from roughly €17.5 
billion to €63 billion, over the coming five years. At the same time, 
the app-developer workforce, including support and marketing staff, 
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is projected to grow from roughly 2 million today to 4.8 million in 
2018 (Mulligan and Card 2014).
Another sign of the increased role of creative and entrepreneurial 
skills is the proliferation of microbusinesses and the rise in self-
employment, enabled by the spread of digital peer-to-peer platforms. 
Etsy, for example, provides an online marketplace for its 1 million 
sellers to offer vintage or handmade art, clothing or jewellery to 
some 30 million registered users. Airbnb allows individuals to 
offer accommodation services, with more than 800,000 listings 
in 33,000 cities all over the world. In several of Europe’s largest 
cities, ‘freelance taxi’ company Uber provides an increasing share 
of transportation services. New business opportunities of this 
kind are reflected in a substantial increase in self-employment in 
most European countries. In the UK, for example, some 4.5 million 
workers—about one in seven—are currently self-employed, the 
highest share since data first began to be collected 40 years ago 
(ONS 2015). 
More generally, digital technology has made self-employment 
a more attractive option because it provides entrepreneurial 
opportunities characterised by low start-up and marketing costs, 
and unprecedented access to information, capital and customers. 
As the digital economy of micro-entrepreneurs, contract-based 
workers and freelancers continues to expand, it will not only 
change the very nature of work, but also require that we promote 
the development of entrepreneurial capabilities themselves, in 
order to increase workers’ understanding of how their skills might 
be applied to start thriving businesses. 
‘Work’ in an age of rapid change
As a wide range of traditionally middle-income work has 
disappeared in the wake of technological advances in computing 
and industrial robotics, the broadly shared fortunes of the 20th-
century labour market have retreated to the extremities. Over 
the next decade, the computerisation of middle-income jobs will 
shift to mainly substituting for low-income workers, while the 
demand for problem-solving, creative and social skills is likely to 
increase further. To make sure that the benefits from technological 
advancements benefit ordinary workers, efforts must be directed 
towards upgrading the digital skills of a large part of the workforce. 
Furthermore, to ensure that workers remain attractive to employers 
in the digital age, European policymakers should focus on fostering 
creative and social skills because these are areas where humans 
are likely to retain a comparative advantage over the increasing 
number of their automated, robotic or virtual colleagues.
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3.2 
IN THE FUTURE, WHAT WILL 
PEOPLE DO?
STEVE BAINBRIDGE 
Cedefop (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training)
It was a sin; perhaps two. No one goes to Paris to eat at McDonald’s, 
and I felt guilty eating ice-cream at midnight. But I was just one person 
in a long queue. To avoid waiting, people could opt to order their food 
using a touchscreen, pay for it with a credit card, and collect it from the 
counter – but they did not. Like me they preferred to wait and speak to 
the polite assistant (probably an undergraduate) at the cash till. Fastfood 
restaurants no longer need people at the counter, just as supermarkets 
don’t need people to operate their checkouts. Technology can do these 
tasks. But these jobs still exist, largely because people need other 
people. Perhaps this is a reason why, ever since the Luddites set about 
smashing the machines of 19th-century England, predictions about 
technology destroying jobs have proved inaccurate.
People need people: the value of quality service and 
human interaction
In the late 1970s, banks in the UK introduced automatic cash 
machines and cut staff, closed branches and reduced opening hours. 
Technology cut costs. But working people could only get into the 
bank at lunchtime when they needed other banking services. They 
would find only one window open, as most bank staff were taking 
their own lunch breaks. Now cash machines are everywhere, but you 
can also call some banks around the clock. Branches are open for 
longer hours, some on Saturdays, with nice people to help you – not 
so much with cash deposits and withdrawals, but with advice about 
mortgages, loans and savings.
Technology has always changed the nature of work, but demand for 
workers has continued to increase. Admittedly, technology now is 
more far-reaching. As Berger and Frey note in the previous chapter, 
around 47 per cent of US employment could be at high risk of being 
automated out of existence over the next 10 or 20 years (Frey and 
Osborne 2013), and it is unlikely that the picture is very different in 
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Europe. But there are reasons to be optimistic about future demand 
for people. Prior to the economic crisis in 2008, despite advances in 
new technology, the EU was enjoying a record employment rate of 
65.7 per cent (Eurostat A). Although the region lost around 7 million 
jobs between 2008 and the depth of the crisis in 2010 (Eurostat 
B), this fall was not as bad as many had feared. Job growth is now 
expected to return to the EU, although rates vary markedly across 
countries (Cedefop 2015 forthcoming).
The loss of manufacturing jobs in the EU appears to have largely 
stopped (Cedefop 2013a). Meanwhile, skill shortages continue 
to exist. Demand for skilled tradespeople, such as plumbers and 
electricians, remains high. Employers have also expressed concerns 
about shortages of graduates in the STEM subjects – science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics – not least in Germany 
(Deutsche Bank 2012) and the UK (Engineer 2012).
Technology can also create jobs. It enables enterprises to make 
existing products better and more efficiently, and to make new things. 
Technology also brings down barriers to entry. Skype software was 
developed in Estonia in 2003 and only acquired by technology giant 
Microsoft in 2011 for $8.5 billion. Small firms and individuals are 
already publishing and distributing books and music via the internet 
and creating apps for smartphones, computers and enabled TVs. 
Three-dimensional printing enables bespoke manufacturing by small 
firms. Aside from opening up opportunities, lowering barriers to 
entry also reduces risk and so may increase the number of budding 
entrepreneurs starting businesses, perhaps encouraged by online or 
‘crowdfunding’ sources like Kickstarter.
Another reason for optimism about demand for human workers is 
that, increasingly, they provide the competitive edge. Price and quality 
will always be important, but they are now expected. Competition 
lies in the quality of service that only people can deliver, because 
people are prepared to pay a little more for quality service and positive 
interaction (Berry et al 1994, Oracle 2011). Fastfood restaurants 
without frontline staff would soon lose customers to competitors who 
have retained their human face. Banks need staff to attract savings 
by giving people information and reassurance. Manufacturers and 
service providers compete by developing personal relationships with 
customers. For that you need people.
The new skills for people who deal with people
Technology is good at replacing routine tasks, and there is no 
direct link between skill level and routine (Cedefop 2013a). Low-skill 
production-line manufacturing jobs may be routine, but the internet is 
replacing medium-level clerical jobs too, as people make purchases 
and applications online. Technology is also affecting high-skilled jobs: 
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aeroplanes without pilots (drones) are already more widely used than 
cars without drivers, and most routine financial trades are processed 
by technology, without human intervention.
In the future, work will be more networked and less rigidly focused 
on a specific workplace or around fixed working hours (Störmer et 
al 2014). Already around 5 million people work shifts in the UK, and 
estimates are that half of all London night-time bus passengers are 
travelling to or from work (Economist 2014). Longer working lives, 
whether due to national changes to the retirement age or individual 
circumstances, also mean that four generations could be working at 
once (Störmer et al 2014). 
And most people will be working in services that indirectly or 
directly improve their clients’ quality of life, such as health, social 
services, tourism and education: jobs where people deal with 
people. Consequently, jobs of the future will require people to think, 
communicate, organise and deal with varied non-routine tasks. 
Workers will need to be adaptable and able to learn new ideas, 
methods or techniques. Moreover, employers will be seeking these 
skills to differing degrees in all types of jobs, at all levels. Foreign 
languages and advanced reading and writing skills are not only 
required by professionals but increasingly, for example, by personal 
care workers, many of whom have not traditionally been highly 
qualified (Cedefop 2013b).
Nevertheless, even if there are jobs available, concerns remain 
that technology is racing ahead, and that skills, organisations and 
institutions need updating more rapidly (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014). Despite high unemployment, employers complain that they 
cannot find the skills they want (Manpower 2013). Not everyone 
will need a PhD to find a job, but upper-secondary-level education 
is rapidly becoming the minimum required to have any reasonable 
job prospects, and skills will need to be updated throughout an 
individual’s working life.
Adapting to disruption: the power of technology to 
help boost skills
Over 10 years ago, confronted by various socioeconomic 
challenges, including technological progress, the European 
Commission, EU member states and social partners agreed to 
cooperate to improve vocational education and training (VET) across 
the EU, under the ‘Copenhagen process’.1 The objectives of this 
process are to improve alignment of VET provision with labour 
market needs, make systems more flexible, encourage mobility 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/vocational-policy/doc/copenhagen-
declaration_en.pdf 
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for learning and working, raise VET’s status (emphasising its role 
in economic excellence, not just social inclusion) and increase 
participation of adults in lifelong learning. The process is regularly 
monitored and progress has been made. The shift to basing VET 
curricula on learning outcomes (a person’s resulting capabilities) 
rather than learning inputs (duration and place of study) has opened 
up different ways to acquire skills. Better methods of validation mean 
that learning, no matter how it is acquired, can lead to recognised 
qualifications. And instruments such as the European qualifications 
framework and certificate and diploma supplements are designed to 
make it easier to understand qualifications from other countries to 
support studying and learning abroad.2
These developments are changing VET substantially. A greater 
emphasis on core, transferable knowledge, skills and competencies 
means that VET is seen less as a specific learning track and more 
as one part of a broader learning system. Labour market-oriented 
learning is also being offered at all qualification levels, by a wider 
range of institutions, including higher education. 
These changes have made some difference. More young people now 
stay on in education and training to at least upper-secondary level, 
and the EU is on course to meet its target of reducing early school-
leaving to an average of 10 per cent by 2020 (Cedefop 2013a). By 
2025, around 40 per cent of the EU workforce will have a tertiary 
level qualification (ibid), although this average will mask considerable 
variation between countries. But reform still has a long way to go and, 
following the economic crisis, there is uncertainty about sustaining 
momentum and investment in change. Vocational learning needs to 
reflect more clearly the wider trends towards greater flexibility in the 
workplace, and be less constrained by place, time and – importantly 
– age. It should be easy for someone to qualify in a trade, craft or 
profession at any point in their career. 
Here, technology can help. Informal education, much of it vocational, 
is widely available online. ‘Massive open online courses’, or MOOCs, 
are improving and expanding. Online learning offers flexibility and 
can be significantly cheaper, making new skills and knowledge 
more accessible and allowing learners to experiment with different 
subjects. But technology is a complement to high-quality teachers 
and trainers, not a reason to replace them. Valuable knowledge and 
experience are stored in people, and information is often a matter 
of interpretation. We need wise minds, not machines, to guide us 
through the maze of facts and figures. In education, as in the wider 
labour market, we will continue to need people.
2 For more on the objectives of the Copenhagen process, see Cedefop 2010; 
on the shift from inputs to outputs, see Cedefop 2009; and on the European 
qualifications framework, see Cedefop 2012.
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Technology is often disruptive, but in the long run generally beneficial. 
Despite continued technological advance, there is cause for 
optimism that future employment rates in Europe will be high. Today’s 
enterprises should not repeat the mistake of the banks in the 1970s 
in believing that technology is a substitute for people. Relationships 
with current or potential customers can make or break a business. 
However, for people and technology to be compatible, we need an 
education and training system that provides people with strong core 
skills and opportunities to acquire a varied skill-set with relative ease. 
Creating such a system remains a work in progress.
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3.3 
COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: 
QUESTIONING INDIVIDUALISED 
APPROACHES TO SKILLS 
DEVELOPMENT
STEFANA BROADBENT 
Nesta
When thinking of the future of work in Europe, automation and 
‘robotisation’ are often invoked as probable developments that will 
lead to the replacement of humans and a progressive reduction in 
the numbers of people in employment. Robotisation in particular is 
presented as a technology of replacement, leading to inactivity and 
exclusion. However, if we consider the changes that we are already 
seeing in the labour market, it is not exclusion and inactivity that 
are on the rise, but self-employment, instability, fragmentation and 
precariousness. Years of automation and digitisation have not excluded 
human beings from the work process, but instead have reconfigured 
their activities and their lives. 
How technology creates labour market uncertainty
It is increasingly common for an individual to experience periods 
of employment followed by periods of unemployment, followed 
by partial employment; or to take on multiple jobs, freelancing, 
temporary and part-time work, and self-employment. There is general 
agreement that we can expect even greater precariousness in the 
jobs market, which in turn will generate instability in individuals’ 
income, professional development and mobility. Indicators published 
for the UK by the Office for National Statistics – such as the length 
of time individuals are unemployed (two-thirds of jobseekers are 
unemployed for less than 24 weeks), the proportion of people who 
are underemployed (9.2 per cent) and the decrease in voluntary job 
turnover (ONS 2014) – all suggest that workers are already living 
with a considerable degree of uncertainty. Traditional ‘linear’ careers 
are increasingly the exception, and most people have a myriad of 
employers, jobs, roles and skills on their CVs.
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The question, therefore, is not how to prevent or minimise the 
potential replacement of humans by increasingly integrated 
information systems, but rather how to handle the instability and 
uncertainty they create. Somewhat paradoxically, one of the 
shortcomings of automated systems and robots has been, until 
recently, their very stability. Automation started by replacing highly 
routine tasks, and it still works best in stable and predictable 
environments. Even in much more advanced systems, where 
machine learning can support adaptation to less fixed, more 
unpredictable situations, interaction with humans still speeds 
up the process of learning how to disambiguate contextual 
information. This may change again in the future, as machine 
learning becomes more sophisticated and interacts with even 
greater quantities of data. 
The prognosis is similar for human workers. Projections of 
which sectors are likely to produce reliable jobs growth tend to 
focus on creative activities, soft relational tasks, managerial and 
coordination roles, all of which involve creating new meanings, 
interpreting contextual conditions and generating alternative, 
potentially unpredictable, solutions. Creativity and innovation rely 
on the capacity to frame problems differently and to integrate 
diverse, occasionally conflicting points of view. Managing instability 
and uncertainty are, therefore, going to be not only an existential 
condition but also a professional asset. 
If we look at the long history of labour, individuals’ experience 
of work has not been characterised by stability, linearity and 
incremental skill development. Modern notions of continuity, 
regulation and predictability represent a short-lived historical 
exception, and in most developing economies today, the 
accumulation of jobs, periods of low activity, and uncertainty 
in markets and ecosystems remain the norm. What is novel in 
the current analysis of work and employment, however, is the 
highly individualistic approach to envisaging future solutions. The 
alternative to the loss of jobs in certain sectors, be they low-end 
services, manufacturing or information-processing roles, is the 
development of new individual skills in relational, creative or scientific 
professions. In a continuation of the shift first brought about by the 
industrial revolution, increasing individual skills through education 
and training is touted as the key to keeping ahead of the logic of 
replacement by automation.
By this view, uncertainty is countered by embracing the cognitive 
skills that enhance a person’s ability to navigate and master 
unpredictable, complex situations. Continuous learning, mobility, 
flexibility and the ability to handle and interpret large amounts of data 
are all skills that we expect workers to maintain in order to keep the 
threat of irrelevance at bay.
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Collective solutions to labour market precariousness
I would like to challenge the assumption that this is an objective 
that can be achieved individually. In the past, social organisations 
– families, companies, tribes, towns or guilds – were structured in 
such a way as to handle individual contingencies and, at the same 
time, to build up networks of expertise. If we look at how ‘cognitive 
resources’ are distributed among the people in an organisation, 
we cannot fail to observe that single individuals are rarely able 
to generate innovative solutions that truly push the boundaries 
of understanding or creativity. Not only do organisations have 
networks of people with different skills, they also have processes 
that are defined over time – tools, data-sets, procedures and roles 
often decades in the making – and which embed and stabilise 
knowledge that can then be individually mobilised. Individual 
intelligence and adaptability have always relied on collective and 
diachronic collaboration.
It is in this ‘collective intelligence’ that the answer to the question 
of flexibility and instability lies. No one will be able to handle 
their existential instability or professional uncertainty alone. The 
growing complexity of the issues that will have to be addressed 
professionally – whether in the public service, financial or logistic 
domains – can only be addressed through innovative forms of 
collective intelligence. The role of networked society and networked 
publics has been amply discussed,1 but I question the notions that 
such networks emerge spontaneously and that individuals can by 
default rely on personal social networks and communities.
Over the last 30 years, in most workplaces, there has been a 
transition from task-based work to project work. At any level, most 
jobs now involve a higher degree of autonomy, requiring greater 
control over time, resources (often informational) and means, 
stronger coordination, and continuous monitoring of progress and 
outcomes. This project-centred approach to work has been reflected 
in the social relations that are constructed on the job. People come 
together around projects and drift apart after their completion. 
Project teams coalesce, collaborate and eventually splinter. The 
project as focal point or ‘coordinating element’ can be detected in 
the composition of individuals’ social networks. Personal networks 
are often represented as a set of clusters that have coalesced 
around a place (university), an activity (football), a company, a family. 
People’s professional networks are organised around projects 
worked on together.2
1 See for example Castells and Cardos 2006, Kelty 2008, Noveck 2008, Varneli 
2008.
2 For more on personal networks, see Broadbent 2011, Rainie and Wellman 2012, 
Vendramin 2012.
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The transition from lifelong linear employment to project-by-project 
working is also redefining identities and personal professional 
trajectories, and making self-employment and freelancing more 
desirable and acceptable. It is also challenging the traditional 
discourse around the role of social capital in professional networks. 
The oft-cited solution to job instability is to leverage social capital 
to support the search for a job, capital or contracts. Unfortunately, 
as much as personal connections are important for finding a job, 
the scale of personal networks will simply be insufficient to address 
the complexities and uncertainties we can expect in the labour 
market of the future.
Instead, the new era of professional development will demand 
a change of scale in the size and diversity of the networks that 
individuals belong to and thus are able to leverage. Innovation will, 
as always, emerge in interaction with tools and systems, but the 
complexity of these will require large networks of people in order 
to be used and understood effectively. If we accept that instability, 
uncertainty and complexity are not only going to be the very stuff 
of our future professional lives but also that they are going to be 
addressed collectively, and thus that all work will be networked and 
distributed in previously unforeseen ways, then we need to think 
about how these networks will come together.
The search for new forms of networked communities, be they for 
social action, political activity, sharing expertise or cocreation, is an 
attempt to anticipate the mechanisms that will allow large, extremely 
distributed, diverse groups of people to join in collective efforts of 
problem-solving, adaptation and decision-making. Interestingly, the 
extensive experience most people in the world have had over the 
past decade or so with social networking services such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Weibo or QQ, has laid the ground for new forms of networked 
collaboration that will be far more complex than those we have seen 
until now. Increasingly, people will be capable of collaborating with 
diverse, distant and occasional contacts on sparse, incomplete and 
messy information. 
Indeed, the real challenge lies in the governance models of these 
organisations. Traditional forms of control are leading to a division of 
labour whereby most people produce data and a few people, aided 
by sophisticated systems, exploit it. This approach is not only unfair 
but also dramatically underuses the extraordinary human potential 
for understanding and handling uncertainty and generating innovative 
solutions. Instead, many people in interaction with sophisticated 
systems will be able to engender far greater knowledge.
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3.4 
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: 
RESPONDING TO 
POLARISATION IN EUROPE’S 
LABOUR MARKET
SARA DE LA RICA 
University of the Basque Country and Fundación de Estudios de 
Economía Aplicada (FEDEA)
Advances in information and communications technologies are 
shaping firms’ demand for labour across the whole of Europe 
while simultaneously easing the globalisation of production, as 
firms are increasingly able to source and monitor most production 
processes from any location in the world. These two phenomena, 
computerisation and globalisation, together create important 
challenges for the future of work.
Computers exhibit a clear comparative advantage over human 
workers in carrying out so-called ‘routine tasks’, activities 
that require codifiable and explicit procedures. In doing these 
tasks, computers exceed humans in speed, accuracy and the 
quality of outcomes, and so for jobs that primarily require these 
characteristics, computers are likely to substitute increasingly for 
human labour as the relative costs of technology decline. Given 
the rapid pace of automation and increasing globalisation, some 
have argued that human labour is severely threatened as a result. 
However, humans have a comparative advantage over computers 
when it comes to ‘cognitive tasks’, which require thinking, 
improvising creative solutions and solving unexpected problems. 
We are also better than machines at activities which require 
flexibility to adapt and interpersonal interactions – ‘interactive’ 
or ‘manual’ tasks. Furthermore, human cognitive and interactive 
abilities can be complementary to the work of computers, rather 
than necessarily substituting for it, and hence computerisation is 
likely to increase the demand for people with these skills.
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The polarisation of the European workforce
The interaction between computers and human work is behind much 
of the employment polarisation that has been observed in the European 
labour market in recent years. There has been a decline in jobs in 
occupations that lie in the middle of the skill distribution, which require 
the ability to carry out routine tasks (such as manual work and clerical 
and administrative jobs). Emerging jobs have tended to be either in the 
low tail of the skill distribution – those related to interactive abilities – or 
in the higher tail of the skill distribution, related to cognitive abilities. 
In the first group are jobs providing personal services, which require 
interpersonal relations, and manual activities, which require adaptability, 
including groups such as hairdressers, domestic service and drivers. In 
the second group are those jobs requiring reasoning, creativity, and more 
general problem-solving skills. Empirical evidence for the existence of this 
polarisation process has been found in the US by Autor and Dorn (2013) 
and more recently in Europe by Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014).
This polarisation raises many important concerns. The first is whether 
increasing computerisation and globalisation entails a decrease in 
the total number of jobs available. To answer this, we must consider 
short-term and long-term effects separately. In the short run, a net 
decline in jobs would be observed if the substitution effect of human 
work by computers is greater than the complementary effect. The 
risk that this is the case appears to be high, although it is likely to 
vary across different countries. In the long run, the outlook is perhaps 
more favourable. As complementarities between computer work and 
human work continue to develop, new jobs will emerge which might 
compensate for any observed short-term decline in the number of 
routine jobs. But there is no consensus on which of the two effects 
will prevail, given that there is enormous uncertainty with respect to 
how many new jobs these complementarities will create.
A second concern relates to the type of workers who are more 
and less affected by the changing nature of jobs. Evidence for the 
US and for Spain (see Autor and Dorn 2009 and Anghel et al 2014 
respectively) suggests that older workers are among the worst losers, 
because they tend to be stuck in routine and hence declining jobs and 
lack the skills to reallocate into the emerging jobs that require either 
interactive or cognitive abilities. On the contrary, young workers are 
seen to be the winners because they are more easily able to relocate 
themselves within the market by redirecting their education and 
sharpening their focus on more cognitive abilities.
A third concern raised by polarisation relates to the potential for an 
increase in labour market inequality. Jobs in the high tail of the skill 
distribution require higher-level education,1 and evidence indicates 
1 Although higher education enables workers to develop cognitive skills, David 
Autor (2014) argues that it is necessary but not sufficient to develop these skills.
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that wage returns to these skills have increased substantially in recent 
years. Indeed, Hanushek et al (2013) found that the average returns to 
cognitive skills2 for 22 developed countries in the period 2011 to 2013 
was 18 per cent, varying from a low of 13 per cent in Sweden to a high 
of 28 per cent in the US. This wage premium is a result of the high-
skilled workers’ higher productivity and also their scarcity. Because 
workers with cognitive abilities are in high demand in the labour market 
and in relatively short supply, firms compete to retain them and hence 
their wages continue to increase. The other end of the emerging jobs 
spectrum is characterised by low-qualified workers who offer interactive 
or manual non-routine abilities. The supply of people for these jobs is 
abundant. As a result, their wages tend to be low and not to increase 
rapidly or reliably. Polarisation is thus a phenomenon that tends to 
increase wage inequality across the population. 
But I would go a step further and argue that not only are wages becom-
ing increasingly unequal, but so are other work conditions. Competition 
to survive in the market for interactive or manual skills is fierce, and 
workers end up having to accept not only poor wages but also greater 
job instability. As such, polarisation is giving rise to a dual labour market, 
with highly productive and scarce workers offering cognitive abilities on 
the one side, and less productive and abundant workers offering inter-
active and manual (non-routine) abilities on the other.
A new world of education, for young and old alike
In the short run it is very difficult to counter this tendency towards 
polarisation and inequality. But more can be done in the long run 
if societies are prepared to commit themselves to excellence in 
education, from preschool through to further and higher education. 
Crucially, this commitment must extend to all citizens, including broader 
access to high-quality post-secondary education, so that a larger 
section of the adult population can pick up new cognitive skills. If 
equality of opportunities is achieved, many more workers will be able 
to acquire the abilities required to position themselves at the higher 
rather than lower end of the skill distribution. Society may thus be less 
unequal – or, to be more precise, less unfairly unequal.
There is one other challenge that most European societies face and 
which has to be taken into account in this setting: the ageing of 
our populations. As we live longer and mortality and fertility rates 
decrease, our demographic pattern is looking more like a rectangle 
and less like a pyramid. The population aged 65 and older in the more 
developed regions tripled between 1950 and 2013, from 94 million to 
287 million, and it is forecast to increase further in coming decades, 
reaching 417 million in 2050 (European Commission 2014).
2 That is, the increase in wages for an increase in these skills equivalent to one 
standard deviation.
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Importantly, this will affect the balance of the supply of labour, with 
younger workers becoming relatively scarcer in the decades ahead. 
Given that younger workers are the ones who are acquiring cognitive 
and computer complementary abilities today, their scarcity may pose 
a difficult supply problem as the nature of skill demand changes. 
At the same time, given that older workers are increasingly stuck in 
lower-skilled, low-paying occupations, the fact that their numbers will 
increase disproportionately in coming years suggests social inequality 
could increase further, with fewer young workers in the high tail of the 
skill distribution and many older workers in its low tail. 
To avoid such an outcome, societies must recognise that the 
challenge of excellence in education is not just for young people 
but also for those already in the workforce who want to retrain and 
improve their skills. Greater equality of opportunities in this respect 
should be available to all, not just to the young. Europe’s workforce 
needs a skills upgrade across all age-groups.
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3.5 
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION: 
HOW SHOULD GOVERNMENTS 
RESPOND?
HENNING MEYER 
London School of Economics
After more than half a decade of debate dominated by the global 
financial crisis, 2014 saw a departure from this singular focus. 
Thomas Piketty (2014) started a global discussion about historical 
patterns of inequality and their negative repercussions. And looking 
to the future rather than back in time, The Second Machine Age 
by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (2014) showed how the digital revolution is 
about to transform our economic and social lives. The key problem 
for policymaking is that these technology-driven developments 
are certain to further increase existing inequalities and to create 
new ones at a time when, as Piketty has shown, we have already 
returned to historically high levels.
The digital revolution and jobs
Labour markets in particular look exposed to the forces of 
progress because many ‘middle-class’ jobs will be vulnerable 
as a result of technological change, either through automation 
or as a result of more polarised global competition. A significant 
proportion of tasks embedded in white-collar jobs can and will be 
automated in the years ahead. Whether you think about secretarial 
work, text analysis or even more complex work such as the 
processing of new research (which IBM’s Watson supercomputer 
already does), there are significant changes on the horizon. 
Studying the structure of work in the US, Carl Benedikt Frey and 
Michael Osborne (2013) came to the conclusion that as much as 
47 per cent of total US employment is at risk, while the equivalent 
figures for European countries, calculated by the Brussels-based 
thinktank Bruegel, range from about 47 per cent in Sweden and 
the UK to 62 per cent in Romania (Bowles 2014).
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The Pew Research Centre canvassed almost 2,000 experts about 
their expectations for the coming decade. Although predictions about 
the end state vary, there seems to be little disagreement about path 
we are on:
‘Half of these experts (48%) envision a future in which robots 
and digital agents have displaced significant numbers 
of both blue- and white-collar workers – with many 
expressing concern that this will lead to vast increases in 
income inequality, masses of people who are effectively 
unemployable, and breakdowns in the social order. The 
other half of the experts who responded to this survey (52%) 
expects that technology will not displace more jobs than it 
creates by 2025. To be sure, this group anticipates that many 
jobs currently performed by humans will be substantially taken 
over by robots or digital agents by 2025. But they have faith 
that human ingenuity will create new jobs, industries, and 
ways to make a living, just as it has been doing since the 
dawn of the Industrial Revolution.’
Pew 2014: 5
The variation in responses is not down to disagreements about the 
short-term effects of the digital revolution. Instead, it is rooted in the 
question of whether economies can repeat historical patterns and 
create more jobs in the end than are destroyed by technological 
change along the way. Either way, there remains a significant role 
for public policy to shape the process so that the sombre ‘social 
breakdown’ scenario does not come to pass – and, even if the 
positive scenario becomes reality, to manage the risk of huge 
amounts of transitional unemployment.
There are big political problems on the horizon. When large parts of 
the middle classes are threatened with unemployment through no 
fault of their own, the political pressure will rise. At a time when the 
political process is more and more focussed on the short term, it is a 
dangerous omission if long-term policy thinking is neglected. Here I 
would like to make three suggestions as to what a framework for this 
kind of (badly needed) new thinking might look like.
A framework for policy responses
First, when jobs are replaced, job descriptions change beyond 
recognition and completely new types of work might arise a proactive 
educational policy is essential. This is common sense, and should 
lead to an immediate rethinking of what today passes as suitable 
educational policy. Much of today’s standard education still relies 
heavily on committing facts to memory rather than on building 
analytical and creative capabilities. This was understandable in days 
gone by when access to information was not necessarily a given, but 
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today information is always available. Instead, it has become much 
more important to know what to do with it. Analytical and creative 
capabilities will be the core ingredients of successful careers in the 
future, as they are transferable and can be applied to new contexts. 
At the very least, the digital revolution will demand that workers are 
more flexible and adaptable, and our educational systems need to 
reflect this much more than they do currently.
The second suggestion concerns the distribution of work. In a sense 
we are back in 1930 when John Maynard Keynes wrote about The 
Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren. In his seminal essay, 
he predicted that economic progress would mean that, for the first 
time, future generations would be freed from taking care of pressing 
economic needs. He was certainly right about the degree of economic 
development but wrong about the 15-hour working week that he 
predicted. Keynes believed that with most economic needs fulfilled, 
people would opt for more leisure time rather than the diminishing 
returns of increasing income.
One policy goal should therefore be creating the economic 
preconditions for and incentivising the reallocation of work. The 
cofounder of Google, Larry Page, seemed to think along the same 
lines when he suggested that we should all work less or divide jobs 
between more people (Selby 2014). In this, Page joins the likes of Virgin 
founder Sir Richard Branson, who has long argued that more flexible 
working hours would allow for a better allocation of work. Our lives are 
becoming more complex and the division between work and leisure 
is becoming increasingly hard to draw. Creating a framework in which 
work is distributed more efficiently would therefore be very welcome.
My third suggestion concerns people who cannot benefit from 
better education or a reallocation of work and still find themselves 
unemployed. In The Second Machine Age, Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
warn about defective aggregate demand in the economy as a result 
of high unemployment, but they stop short of making a direct policy 
recommendation. Instead, they suggest that the idea of a basic 
income should be revisited while acknowledging the fact that work 
also has important social purposes beyond simply earning a living.
Without going more deeply into the debate about the basic income, 
there are at least two major drawbacks to this solution. The first is the 
one acknowledged by Brynjolfsson and McAfee: work does not just 
generate income but is also a source of fulfillment and self-esteem 
and an important part of our daily social interactions. This important 
function cannot be replaced in a change to ‘handing out money’ so 
that people can remain functional consumers. The second aspect 
is that, by its usual definition, a basic income is paid to everybody, 
including the ‘winners’ of the brave new digital world, and therefore 
represents an inefficient use of scarce public resources.
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A much more focused way of addressing unemployment would be 
to take the basic idea of the European Union’s youth guarantee and 
apply its principles to the general labour market. The youth guarantee 
makes a concrete offer of a job, apprenticeship or traineeship to 
unemployed young people across the EU, and thus seeks to eradicate 
stubbornly high youth unemployment. There is no apparent reason 
why this principle and the various implementation lessons currently 
being learned across Europe – good and bad – cannot be transferred 
to the wider labour market.
A public job guarantee could be introduced, paying at least a 
salary at the basic income level, so that everyone looking for a job 
could find one. This would concentrate public resources on the 
people most in need, preserve the social functions of work, and 
guarantee that people are protected not just from economic poverty 
but also from socially poorer lives. There would be another public 
policy benefit as well: given that governments would guarantee 
employment, they could set incentives in such a way that hitherto 
underserved areas receive the labour injection they require. Against 
the backdrop of ageing societies, the whole area of old-age and 
health care, for example, is likely to require more workers in the 
future, and a public job guarantee could make sure that the supply 
of workers keeps up with rising demand. Finally, there is the added 
consideration that care and other personal services, as well as 
work depending on social capital, are areas that are less likely to be 
significantly affected by the digital revolution, and so represent an 
opportunity for sustainable employment and jobs growth.
The challenge for governments
We are only at the beginning of the ‘second machine age’ – the first 
being the period in the early 20th century when mass production 
developed, allowing a range of consumer and capital goods to be 
produced more cheaply – and the full implications of the digital 
revolution are yet to become clear. It is, however, important to look 
at the changes likely to happen from the situation we are currently 
in. The prospect of new and quickly widening inequalities is 
particularly worrying when viewed from our current starting position, 
with the highest levels of inequality in living memory. Nobody can 
accurately predict how things will play out, but if only a small part of 
the well-founded predictions become reality then we are facing the 
prospect of major political and social upheavals.
It is therefore imperative to think about sustainable policy solutions 
now, in order to be prepared to minimise the adverse effects and 
take full advantage of the extraordinary opportunities of the digital 
revolution. None of this is set in stone and the political debate has 
only just begun. But it is important to start somewhere and over 
time to bring these issues into mainstream policy discourse. For 
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now, however, what all too often passes as a governmental ‘digital 
agenda’ seems woefully inadequate in light of the major challenges 
that lie ahead. 
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3.6 
WELCOMING OUR 
ROBOT OVERLORDS: THE 
DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
DIANE COYLE 
University of Manchester
People have worried about the effects of technological change on 
economic and social life since the dawn of capitalism – probably 
since the dawn of human society. Yet technological change is without 
question the driving force in improving living standards. This is not 
to say that ‘techno-worries’ are misplaced. Even at its most benign, 
technology is disruptive: whole categories of work become redundant; 
there are winners and losers; fortunes are made and lost; politics and 
power structures change; and deep, long-lasting social changes are 
set in motion.
Previous examples of general purpose technologies that have had 
these wide and deep effects include printing, steam power and 
electricity. Each time, people have been forcefully struck by the speed 
of change and the disruption it causes. But the vital characteristic thing 
about today’s digital technologies is the unprecedented speed of their 
advance, and the corresponding rapid fall in their cost. The economic 
forces this unleashes cannot fail to be extraordinarily large. So it is no 
wonder that worries about ‘our robot overlords’ have emerged.
Natural constraints on progress
Every advance in technology has cost some jobs. We no longer 
have people who walk around the streets waking up the workers 
– affordable alarm clocks made them redundant. Not many are 
employed now in the horse-drawn carriage industry, or making 
whalebone corsets. But new jobs took their place, on assembly 
lines and in offices. These jobs required an increase in literacy and 
numeracy in the workforce as a whole, which was delivered by 
the expansion of free universal education. And now we have new 
categories of jobs, including data scientists and viral marketers – 
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many of which are probably beyond the comprehension of most of us. 
Technological progress has been disruptive but always – eventually – 
good for economic growth.
If ‘this time is different’, it will be because of the speed and scale 
of advances in the digital technologies. Moore’s law states that 
processing speeds have been increasing at about 40 per cent 
a year for 50 years, far faster than the speed of progress in any 
earlier technology. One recent article predicted that by 2025 there 
will be robots or smart machines with an IQ higher than 90 per 
cent of Americans (Davidow and Malone 2014). This is not just a 
rich economy issue, either: low-wage countries are also affected 
by automation. Foxconn, which employs a million people in China, 
recently said it plans to install 30,000 robots a year, with a target 
workforce of 1 million such ‘Foxbots’.1
How worried should we be by the speed of change? Not as worried 
as the most alarmist predictions suggest, I believe. Foxconn currently 
has just 10,000 Foxbots installed, and has meanwhile taken on an 
additional 100,000 human workers. The potential for automation is 
real; but if it does happen, it will not necessarily be at the expense of 
workers. Jobs will only be automated out of existence if businesses 
actually invest in the computerised equipment. History provides many 
examples of new technologies spreading very slowly because the 
old technologies remain profitable, or because additional secondary 
investment is needed, or because there are other barriers to achieving 
the necessary level of investment.
Retooling or ‘digitising’ a production process or service is not simple. 
NHS productivity would leap forward if records could be fully digitised 
but, despite making a huge investment in the attempt, the NHS still 
employs more than 750,000 people in secretarial work (although 
this figure is predicted to decline to 580,000 by 20252). Besides, 
computerising the records so far has been a mixed blessing: the old 
physical system was reliable; new systems in hospitals often frustrate 
their users with crashes and passwords that don’t work.
New general purpose technologies also require significant secondary 
investment before they can have their full transformative effects. 
Paul David (1990), looking at the spread of electricity in the 1920s 
and ’30s, showed it required the building of grids and networks, 
secondary innovations in devices to use electricity, rebuilding factories 
to make the most efficient use of electricity rather than steam, and so 
on. In fact, the peak effects of an innovation dating back to the 1880s 
were felt between 1930 and 1950.
1 For more on ‘Foxbots’, see Xinhua Net 2011, Bora 2014.
2 See: https://nationalcareersservice.direct.gov.uk/advice/planning/jobprofiles/
Pages/MedicalSecretary.aspx 
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There are still a lot of things the new digital technologies cannot do. 
It is easy to be carried away in the excitement of self-driving cars 
or medical diagnosis by software. However, these need massive 
investment before they become commonplace. Foxconn found that 
their first-generation Foxbots lacked the dexterity needed to do even 
simple routine tasks and could not judge quality on the production 
line. Just as cars required the road network to be built, Google cars 
require not only Google maps and GPS but also a large network of 
sensors to be installed, and still hand over control to a human driver if 
something unexpected happens.
The effects of progress on inequality
As technological progress accounts for the vast majority of long-term 
economic growth, we should welcome automation. Investment in 
new capital will enhance labour productivity and ultimately improve 
living standards. As citizens of ageing countries with slow population 
growth and a lacklustre productivity record, Europeans should be 
embracing the robots: we will need them to pay our pensions and 
perhaps even to care for us.
This is not to downplay at all the disruptive effects on jobs in the 
meantime. Automation might be good in the long term, but in the 
short term there will be winners and losers. David Autor (2014) has 
drawn attention to the specific tasks that can and can’t be performed 
by robots or computers. He calls it Polanyi’s paradox (after Michael, 
not Karl): ‘We can know more than we can tell’. That is, he argues, 
many tasks rely on humans’ tacit knowledge, whereas digital 
machines can only substitute for (literally) codifiable knowledge. Failing 
to distinguish between these types of activity makes for a tendency to 
overstate the extent to which computers will ever be able to substitute 
for human workers. 
Most business processes consist of a number of tasks, to be 
performed by a mix of machines with different functions and humans 
with different kinds of skill. If the machines become much more 
productive then they will substitute for both machines and humans. 
But they will also raise the productivity and economic value of humans 
who can perform complementary tasks. 
People in professional jobs tend to have high cognitive skills that 
complement the routine tasks computers can do. There has been 
a growth in demand for their services without (yet) a corresponding 
increase in the supply of people with high skills, and they have seen 
growth in employment and real earnings. At the low-income end of 
the labour market, people tend to have only partly complementary 
skills – in other words, working with a computer makes some of them 
somewhat more productive (more so for a truck driver using GPS 
and a logistics system than for a cleaner). Although demand for these 
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workers has been growing, so too has supply. Their real wages have 
been at best growing slowly and in some countries have declined.
This polarisation of employment growth – with gains in high skill 
and low skill jobs – has led to increased polarisation of incomes 
too. Inequality has several causes but technology is one of the 
most important. Indeed, the economic historian Robert Allen 
(2007) has argued that an increase in inequality is an intrinsic part 
of technology-driven growth. In the initial phase, capital investment 
needs to earn a high rate of return to encourage more saving and 
investment. When that has occurred, raising labour productivity, 
real wages increase in the second phase. These phases are long – 
he dates them from around 1760–1850 and then the 1850s to the 
early 20th century.
There is nothing inevitable about a repetition of 19th-century 
inequality. The markets of modern societies are nothing like the 
markets of a century ago; they sit in a wholly different social and 
institutional context. However, it is worrying that, since about 1980, 
income inequality has increased in most European countries as 
well as the US. The rise in inequality has been driven largely by big 
increases in the highest incomes – the higher returns to those very 
skilled people, as well as to lucky people in sectors like banking where 
the institutional structures and deregulation have permitted extremely 
high earnings. Meanwhile, the dilution of union power and downward 
pressure on public spending have inhibited wage growth and led to 
worse working conditions for many people in low-paid jobs.
The next phases of technological progress will require an institutional 
and political response to the risk of yawning inequality. We must 
do better today than was achieved during previous episodes of 
significant technological advance. Indeed, those experiences teach 
us that structural change in the economy is not a peaceful process. 
The economic dislocations and extreme inequality of the 1920s 
led to economic, political and human disaster in the 1930s and 
1940s. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, in a less cataclysmic period, 
deindustrialisation resulted in the creation of a group of long-term 
unemployed households whose complex poverty has now been 
handed down the generations.
Fair progress: policy responses to the challenges of 
technological change
An obvious requirement is for more and better education. This may 
sound banal, but little has been accomplished despite the fact 
that the policy world has been talking about the need to improve 
education for more than a decade. Most European countries have 
systems that deliver an elite with high cognitive skills. The need now 
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is to focus education and training on non-routine (cognitive and 
non-cognitive) skills that will ensure people are able to complement 
rather than be substituted by new machines in the workplace. 
Policymakers need to take seriously the accumulated evidence that 
interventions before the age of 10, and even before the age of three, 
make substantial differences to life outcomes, and to put serious 
money and effort into early interventions for the lowest income 
families. At a time of budget cuts, this will mean reduced subsidies 
to higher education and increased subsidies to primary education 
and nurseries.3
The other obvious policy challenge lies in inequality, of incomes and 
wealth. Extreme inequality might matter for economic growth – the 
evidence is a bit mixed, although IMF economists believe this to be 
the case (Ostry et al 2014) – and it certainly matters for politics. The 
rise of populism and new parties at the extremities of the political 
spectrum is the result of many people believing the economy is not 
working for them, while it is giving others very high rewards indeed. 
And it is hard not to agree with them: it is not the robots drinking 
champagne in Davos, but ‘the 1 per cent’. Distribution of income is 
a political issue as well as an economic one.
The long-term social effects of new technologies are vast, and 
impossible to forecast. Printing enabled the Renaissance, which 
made possible the Protestant Reformation and the scientific 
Enlightenment. Railways enabled urbanisation, because sufficient 
food could be transported from the countryside to urban markets; 
and then suburbanisation, enabling further economic growth. 
Nobody in 1850 would have predicted that half the world’s 
population would live in cities by 2015. It is impossible to say what 
kind of world we are shaping with digital technologies, but to be sure 
what the world is like a few decades from now is up to us.
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3.7 
AUTOMATION AND EQUALITY: 
THE CHALLENGE TO 
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS
ALAN MANNING 
London School of Economics and Political Science
Most European labour markets are currently a mess, afflicted by 
stubbornly high unemployment or stagnant (even falling) average 
real wages – or both. There are two main views about the cause of 
this mess. First, that it is simply the result of the economic turmoil 
unleashed by the 2008 financial crisis and not yet resolved, especially 
in the eurozone. Second, that it is the consequence of deeper-seated 
structural changes in labour markets that have severed the link 
between economic growth, employment and living standards. 
Put more melodramatically, the fear is that robots are after many 
people’s jobs, and one does not have to spend much time online 
or open many newspapers to see these fears writ large. In June, 
the BBC asked: ‘Will workplace robots cost more jobs than they 
create?’ In November, the Independent ran the headline: ‘A third 
of UK jobs to be replaced by robots and computers in next 20 
years’.1 These stories vary from short-term threats to jobs and 
wages, to longer-term musings on what will happen when robots 
are smarter than people.
I tend to the view that the short-term crisis is more important 
than the longer-term trends, and that our biggest problem at the 
moment when it comes to raising living standards for workers is a 
low level of investment not a high level. This essay outlines why we 
should not unduly fear the impact of new technology on the labour 
market. It is not, however, a call for complacency: new technology, 
including but not confined to robots, will have sizeable impacts on 
our societies, and active policy responses are needed to ensure the 
benefits are shared fairly.
1 See Crossley 2014, Vincent 2014 
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Popular views of automation
A Nobel prize-winning economist has summarised these threats:
‘The proportion of the working population required to man 
the extremely profitable automated industries would be 
small; wage rates would thus be depressed; there would 
have to be a large expansion of the production of the 
labour-intensive goods and services which were in high 
demand by the few multi-multi-multi-millionaires.’
The economist was James Meade and he died in 1995 – he wrote 
those words in 1964. He was not alone in fretting about the impact 
automation was going to have in the 1950s and 1960s: Kurt 
Vonnegut’s first novel, Player Piano, published in 1952, was about 
the dystopian impact automation would have. And we can trace this 
type of fear back through Karl Marx’s hypothesis of the immiserisation 
of the proletariat to the earliest stages of the industrial revolution and 
the original Luddites, the handloom weavers who saw their livelihood 
being destroyed by the power loom.
Historically, these fears came to nothing. Since the start of the 
industrial revolution there is a clear upward trend in real wages, and 
there is no clear trend in unemployment. Real wages have risen 
because productivity has risen, and productivity has risen because 
of technical changes, which have largely been the result of increased 
mechanisation and automation in production. It is clear that the 
average worker has benefitted from new technology, rather than 
being harmed by it. To be sure, there are often losers from innovation, 
especially in the short term. But over long periods of time, everyone 
has gained from it – there is currently virtually no one in Europe who is 
as badly off as the average person was two hundred years ago.
So why are popular views about the impact of technology so much 
at variance with the evidence? I think the reason is that the losers 
are often very visible, and the losses heavily concentrated on small 
groups, whereas the gains are spread more widely and are less 
conspicuous. Take the example of the handloom weavers, for 
whom the invention of the power loom was undoubtedly a disaster. 
The power loom was introduced because it was a cheaper way 
to produce cloth, and over time it led to a reduction in the price of 
clothing. This was good for the general population, who now had 
more money left over after buying their clothes, which they spent on 
a whole variety of goods and services. As they did so, they increased 
the demand for the workers who produced those other goods and 
services. If they treated themselves to some fish and chips, there were 
now more fish-fryers in the economy as a result of the invention of the 
power loom. It sounds ridiculous to say but it is true, and to ignore 
these effects is to ignore the largest impact of technological change.
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Who owns the robots?
Previous waves of technological change have ultimately been good 
for all workers, in spite of the many commentators who believed 
the opposite. But the nature of new technology is that there is no 
guarantee that the future will be like the past. So who are the winners 
and losers from the latest wave of innovation?
In recent years the most important labour market trend has 
been job polarisation or hollowing-out. This change seems to be 
occurring in all European economies and – to date – shows no 
sign of stopping. What is unusual about the current situation is that 
these ‘losers’ in the middle of the distribution make up a politically 
critical group. This is perhaps the simplest explanation as to why 
the average voter in Europe is so dissatisfied with the way their 
economy and government are performing. The biggest winners, by 
contrast, are a tiny group of those at the very top of the earnings 
distribution, the so-called ‘1 per cent’.
This outcome suggests that we need policies to make sure that 
automation leads to benefits that are widely shared, as there is no 
guarantee this will happen automatically. Making sure that growth 
is inclusive means bearing down on inequality, and this is where we 
need progressive policies.
What might these policies look like? We need to do more to 
remedy inequalities in our education systems to ensure that they 
offer fair opportunities for all and that parental wealth and privilege 
cannot buy advantage. And we need to make sure that people 
have the skills to take advantage of change. We will also probably 
need at some point to take on vested interests, for example in the 
professions and related services that have done so well in recent 
years. Technology may well undermine the mystique of expertise that 
surrounds so many workers in the professions, whether medical, 
legal, educational or financial. But, even as their privileged positions 
are threatened by computerisation, these groups are bound to put 
up a fight to protect their gains, and the professions are probably 
the best-organised workers in today’s labour market. We will need to 
regulate financial markets to make sure that the earnings of those in 
that sector really do reflect its benefits to wider society. 
Lastly, I think we will need to do more redistributive taxation, to tax 
the highest incomes more heavily. So large has been the increase 
in the share of income going to the top 1 per cent that taxing them 
more heavily would only return them to the level of earnings they had 
a few short years ago – it is simply not credible that slightly higher 
taxes will drastically reduce work effort among high-earners. But we 
will need to deal with tax avoidance and evasion, which is the more 
serious problem when it comes to raising taxes on the richest.
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Crucially, however, if the increasing importance of robots means 
that the share of all income earned by capital rises, then we will 
need to pay more attention to the distribution of wealth. Suppose 
we end up in a world where machines can fill every post more 
cheaply than human workers, we might worry about how people will 
cope. If most people own no wealth, then these fears are justified. 
But if wealth is evenly spread, it is a bit like worrying about what 
British aristocrats do with their time just because every job on the 
estate is done by servants. The important question is ‘who owns 
the robots?’ If ownership is widely spread, then quality of life will be 
high for everyone.
Progressive policies to save capitalism’s dreams 
of growth
The interaction of the market and technological progress cannot 
be guaranteed to deliver inclusive growth and a fair distribution of 
wealth. Making sure that growth in Europe is inclusive is the job of 
the political process, and progressive politics in particular, as it is 
motivated primarily by the underlying belief that the distribution of 
rewards should be fair. Those on the progressive side of politics 
should not be apologetic about their beliefs in a fair society and the 
policies needed to move us in that direction. 
Current trends are limiting or reducing the opportunities and 
rewards for the labour market’s ‘middle class’. But if there is no 
benefit from growth for the median earner then they can hardly be 
expected to support growth-friendly policies – and the likelihood 
is that, eventually, they won’t. Ultimately, progressive politics is 
needed – as is often said – to save capitalism from itself. 
References
Crossley R (2014) ‘Will workplace robots cost more jobs than they 
create?’, BBC News website, 30 June 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-27995372 
Meade JE (1964) Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property, Routledge
Vincent J (2014) ‘A third of UK jobs to be replaced by robots and computers 
in next 20 years’, Independent, 10 November 2014. http://www.independent.
co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/a-third-of-uk-jobs-to-be-replaced-by-robots-
and-computers-in-next-20-years-9851119.html 
IPPR  |  Technology, globalisation and the future of work in Europe110
3.8 
MANUFACTURING A LIFE OF 
LEISURE
DONALD STORRIE 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions
There is nothing that policymakers want to know more keenly than the 
shape of the future. We all seem to believe that we are living in very 
uncertain times, and the fact that more and more policy research is 
being reoriented towards so-called ‘foresight studies’ is a clear sign of 
this. We may not know where we are going but there is a perception 
that we are going there fast. 
One crucial uncertainty is this: where will the jobs of the future 
come from? After seven years of stagnation in Europe, facing an 
historically high level of global competition, and given the ever-
increasing pace of labour-saving innovation, can our economies 
generate gainful employment for everyone who wants it? This is a 
big question, not only for our economies but also for the welfare of 
our citizens and the cohesion of our societies.
The future of manufacturing jobs in Europe
I think the future of jobs in manufacturing in Europe is of greatest 
interest now. Manufacturing is of exceptional importance in this first 
real era of globalisation. The strongest growth in demand will continue 
to be outside Europe, and almost 80 per cent of Europe’s exports 
are manufactured goods. It is also a very opportune moment to think 
strategically about manufacturing, as there is much to suggest that 
we are on the cusp of another industrial revolution. While there are 
exciting developments in, for example, bio- and nanotechnology, most 
interest is being generated in the application of robotics and automation 
technologies in manufacturing.
These technological innovations will lead to a massive increase in 
manufacturing productivity. Windfall profits will accrue to those in the 
vanguard of this revolution. It will also benefit highly skilled workers 
– mainly software developers, engineers, and those who work in 
material science and research. Consumers will benefit from the lower 
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prices that follow on from lower production costs. The technologies 
will save massive amounts of labour – and so the question is, where 
will people find work? We have been in similar situations before and, it 
is said, predictions of ‘the end of work’ have continually been proved 
wrong. But have they really? After a long boom, unemployment 
in Europe hit a 10-year low in March 2008. But this ‘low’ stood at 
6.7 per cent of the labour force, with 16 million Europeans officially 
unemployed (Eurostat A).
Technology has, of course, replaced manufacturing jobs before. 
Why, conceptually, could it be different this time? One possible 
difference is that the destructive effects of the new technologies are 
simply larger, because ICT is a truly generic technology that can 
spawn innovations – and replace jobs – in practically every corner 
of the economy. Globalisation means that the lag or ‘catch-up 
time’ for new technology to be taken up by very large and low-cost 
competitors is likely be very short indeed, and it is far from clear that 
the technological leadership of the west will continue. Moreover, 
previous waves of technological innovations led to workers working 
alongside a machine: now, the substitution of labour by machines 
is so far-reaching that in some spheres the workerless factory is 
becoming a reality.
While it certainly would be desirable to see a resurgence of 
manufacturing in Europe, is this a realistic hope? High labour costs, 
while not the only factor behind a firm’s decision about where to 
locate, are the most important reason why manufacturing has shifted 
out of Europe. The supply chain story of one of the iconic products 
of the 21st century – the iPad – illustrates a vital point. When it 
first went on the market the iPad retailed for $500, but it cost only 
$8 to manufacture. In some respects this is encouraging news for 
European manufacturing. With wages making up an increasingly 
smaller proportion of the total value-added of products, they 
become less vital to decisions about where production is based. 
When the innovative link in supply chains is in the manufacturing 
process itself – something which is likely to be quite common with 
the emerging technologies – it is both highly desirable and feasible 
that this remains and develops in Europe, not least in order to 
keep R&D and other related services here as well. The bad news, 
however, is that firms will employ a significantly lower number of 
workers in the actual production process.
The need for a new industrial policy
After decades of efforts, including by the European Commission, it is 
hard to see how active labour market policy can do much more – at 
least in Europe’s better-performing economies – to respond to labour 
market changes. Moreover, it simply cannot cope with the global 
competitive challenges we now face.
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Industrial policy has gone through many phases. Old-style policy 
focused on product market interventions (production subsidies, 
state ownership) and then on taxes and subsidies designed to 
correct market failures (training subsidies, investment allowances). 
More modern versions have acted to build systems and networks, 
promote beneficial institutions, and align strategic priorities. 
The risks of industrial policy remain the same: bad government 
decisions, rent-seeking, and the risk of capture when the state 
and big business engage. And it is always prone to lapse into 
protectionism. Industrial policy is notoriously difficult, perhaps even 
more in its implementation than its formulation. The implementation 
phase itself requires significant resources, and it needs to be 
shepherded along by talented officials.
After decades in which it has been held in low regard, it is time 
for industrial policy to once again take centre stage. We must first 
embrace the notion that it is possible to do successful industrial 
policy. We must also accept that in this era of global giants it is almost 
inconceivable that EU member states can face up to the challenge 
alone. I think that there actually is a role for some of the more old-
fashioned, selective policies during periods of radical technological 
change like we are experiencing now. Moreover, it is now that 
infrastructure needs to be built up and standards to be established. 
Economic democracy and Keynes’ ‘life of leisure’
I believe that technological unemployment (Joseph Schumpeter’s 
‘destruction’) may be much more prevalent in the years to come, 
and that the opportunity for Schumpeterian creation, at least in 
terms of jobs, will be more limited. In the 1930s, John Maynard 
Keynes took an optimistic view of the impact of technology, 
believing that eventually we could all work 15 hours a week and 
spend the rest of our time in leisure.1 However, the pace of working-
time reduction has slowed appreciably in recent decades, while 
unemployment has secularly increased. 
Working-time reductions and job-sharing will have to be revisited. 
The really thorny issue is – as it always has been – who will reap 
the returns on the capital of the forthcoming industrial revolution? 
Will the robot workers – like in the dystopian film Blade Runner – be 
owned by global mega-corporations that preside over an urban 
sprawl of the disenfranchised poor? Or will there be an economic 
democracy of genuine profit-sharing, allowing the majority of our 
citizens to reap the benefits of Keynes’ vision of a life of leisure?
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4.1 
A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN 
EMPLOYERS: SKILLS 
USE, POLARISATION AND 
WORKFORCE CHANGES
TONY DOLPHIN 
IPPR
As the previous chapters in this collection have shown, academics 
and researchers have a lot of interesting things to say about how the 
labour market in Europe is changing as a result of globalisation and, in 
particular, technological innovation. Many fear that the pace of change 
over the next decade will be so great that it will result in permanently 
higher levels of unemployment and a polarisation of the workforce. 
Arguably, these effects can already be seen in the data, with EU 
unemployment at 10 per cent and evidence in many countries that the 
proportion of jobs requiring mid-level skills is declining.
But what do firms have to say about change, and how are they 
responding to it? To find out, we commissioned Populus to conduct a 
survey of 2,500 firms across five European countries, and this chapter 
reports the results of this exercise. The survey covered 500 firms in 
each of France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, and in all five 
countries the sample ensured a representative mix of firms by size, 
by broad sector of the economy (private, nationalised industries and 
public corporations and the public sector) and by industry.
The rise and rise of computing skills
The survey suggests that employers require their employees to use 
computing skills more than mathematical skills, reading and writing 
several pages of text, or mechanical or other technical skills. Half of 
firms reported that more than 60 per cent of their employees need 
to use computers, compared to 35 per cent who said the same 
for needing to read or write more than four pages of text, 24 per 
cent for mathematical skills and only 21 per cent for mechanical 
or technical skills. Although there is likely to be a big variation in 
the particular use that people make of computers – from simply PA
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sending emails, through word-processing and simple spreadsheet 
tasks, up to running highly complex programmes – the same is 
probably true of the other skill categories . It seems fair to say that 
we have reached a point where computing skills have become 
most valuable for employees in the European jobs market.
Table 4.1.1
Distribution of skill use in European firms, by proportion of employees 
requiring certain skills (% of firms)
Maths 
skills
Reading 
or writing 
more than 
four pages 
of text
Using 
computers
Mechanical 
or 
technical 
skills
Used by fewer than 20 
per cent of all workers
36 25 16 36
Used by 20–39 per cent 23 21 17 22
Used by 40–59 per cent 17 18 17 21
Used by 60–79 per cent 9 11 12 10
Used by 80+ per cent 15 25 38 11
Mean 39 47 58 37
Note: Based on Populus survey of 2,500 firms in five countries. Excludes those 
replying ‘don’t know’.
Skill use is, to a certain extent, linked to the size of a firm. Small 
firms – those with fewer than 50 employees – are least likely to have a 
high proportion of their workforce using mathematical skills and least 
likely to have seen this proportion increase over the last two years. 
Although there is a less clear pattern for reading and writing longer 
text and the use of computers, in both cases small firms are least 
likely to have seen an increase in the proportion of employees using 
these skills over the past two years. These differences are, however, 
small compared to the differences that are apparent across industries. 
Here there is much clearer evidence of a polarisation of skills use.
The polarisation of skills use by industry
There have been increasing concerns in recent years – on both 
sides of the Atlantic – about an actual or potential polarisation of 
the workforce, with mid-skill jobs disappearing and more high-
skilled jobs, but also more low-skilled jobs, being created. From 
the results of our survey, we are unable to say whether firms 
believe such a process of polarisation is taking place. However, the 
survey does reveal a different type of polarisation of skills use – by 
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industry. And this would be consistent with the wider trend towards 
polarisation that so worries economists.
Broadly speaking, when firms are categorised by industry they fall into 
one of three groups: 
1. industries in which a relatively high proportion of employees 
use mathematical skills, read or write at least four pages of 
text and use computers
2. industries that are average in this respect
3. industries in which a relatively low proportion use these skills. 
In the first group are financial services, accountancy, legal services, 
IT and communications and real estate; in the third group are 
hospitality and leisure, retailing, manufacturing, and transport. 
The pattern for use of mechanical and technical skills is different, 
being most used in manufacturing, construction and transport. 
Thus, hospitality and leisure and retailing are the only sectors 
where skills use is below average across the board. 
Table 4.1.2
Percentage of employees of European firms requiring certain skills, by 
industrial sector (mean % across all responses)
Maths 
skills
Reading 
or writing 
more than 
four pages 
of text
Using 
computers
Mechanical 
or 
technical 
skills
Manufacturing 38 39 45 45
Construction 39 43 44 41
Retail 35 38 53 32
Financial services 49 55 71 32
Hospitality and leisure 30 37 45 36
Accountancy 47 58 71 34
Legal 40 65 78 36
IT and telecoms 47 56 70 35
Media, marketing, PR 
and sales
33 50 72 31
Education 40 58 64 35
Transportation and 
distribution
36 37 49 43
Real estate 45 65 75 37
Other 37 49 60 36
Note: Based on Populus survey of 2,500 firms in five countries.
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This is perhaps not surprising. The industries in the first group would 
conform to most people’s expectations of industries that employ a high 
proportion of high-skilled workers, while the opposite would be true of 
hospitality and leisure and retailing. What is more interesting, however, 
is that this gap in skills use appears to be widening (see table 4.1.3). 
In particular, firms in the industries that have a low proportion of their 
workforce using skills across the four categories are also least likely to 
have seen an increase in the proportion using these skills.
This suggests that a sectoral polarisation of skills use is occurring. 
In one group of industries, a high and often increasing proportion of 
the workforce is required either to use mathematical, reading/writing 
and computing skills or to use mechanical and technical skills, while 
in another group the proportion using any kind of skills is low and 
increasing at a slow pace. Patterns of skills use might therefore be 
leading to increased inequality, with the risk that people working in 
‘low-skill’ industries, even if they endeavour to acquire more skills, 
will have very few opportunities to make use of them.
Table 4.1.3
Firms saying that the proportion of employees using certain skills has 
increased in the last two years, by industrial sector (net % of firms)
Maths 
skills
Reading 
or writing 
more than 
four pages 
of text
Using 
computers
Mechanical 
or 
technical 
skills
Manufacturing 29 25 41 32
Construction 23 21 32 12
Retail 10 12 35 20
Financial services 21 22 38 16
Hospitality and leisure 3 8 29 16
Accountancy 10 25 36 20
Legal 17 17 42 8
IT and telecoms 20 19 34 12
Media, marketing, PR 
and sales
-2 22 29 19
Education 12 19 37 8
Transportation and 
distribution
22 19 40 29
Real estate 3 16 28 12
Other 13 17 35 15
Note: Based on Populus survey of 2,500 firms in five countries. Data shows the 
share reporting an increase minus the share reporting a decrease in each case.
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One in, one out: a picture of workforce changes 
as a result of globalisation and technology
In addition to asking firms about the use of various skills by their 
employees, our survey also asked about changes in their workforces. 
In particular, we asked firms if they had reduced the number of full-time 
employees that they employed for any one of a number of reasons, and 
also if they had increased them for one of a different set of reasons. 
The survey revealed a high level of turnover of staff, with at least a 
quarter of firms saying that they had reduced staff for each of the four 
reasons given – reduced demand for the firm’s products or services, 
outsourcing, the introduction of new technology, and other efficiency 
savings – and at least a quarter saying that they had increased 
staff numbers for each of one of three reasons – increased demand 
for their products or services, bringing elements of the production 
process back in-house, and the introduction of new technology. 
Figure 4.1.1
Increasing or reducing employee numbers for various reasons 
(% of firms)
Other efficiencies
Reduced demand
Outsourcing production
New technology
Reducing number of employees
Increased demand
Bringing production
in-house
New technology
Increasing number of employees
0 10 20 30 40 50
0 10 20 30 40 50
Note: Based on Populus survey of 2,500 firms in five countries. 
Here, there was a clear pattern relating to the size of the firm. Broadly 
speaking, the more employees that a firm has, the more likely it is to 
be reducing its staff as a result of outsourcing, new technology and 
efficiency savings (but not reduced demand, where firm size does not 
appear to be an issue). At the same time, however, a larger firm is 
more likely to be increasing the number of its full-time employees due 
to bringing production in-house and introducing new technology. 
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With the exception of IT and communication firms, which are more 
likely to be increasing or decreasing employee numbers, there is no 
strong sectoral pattern for employee turnover.
What is most interesting, however, in the context of fears about 
globalisation and technological innovation destroying jobs, is that the 
proportions of firms saying that outsourcing and the introduction of new 
technology have led to a reduction in the number of their employees 
is very similar to the number saying that bringing production in-house 
and new technologies have led to an increase. At the aggregate level, 
28 per cent of firms say outsourcing has led to a reduction in staff 
numbers, while 25 per cent say bringing production in-house has led 
to an increase; 31 per cent say new technology has led to a reduction 
in staff numbers, and 31 per cent say that it has led to an increase. 
Furthermore, this pattern of matching increases and decreases is 
repeated across most industries. This suggests economists’ worst fears 
about job losses as a result of structural change might be misplaced. 
There may be a lot of churn in the labour market, but a pattern of net 
change in either direction is difficult to detect.
Conclusions
It would be wrong to attempt to draw very strong conclusions from 
the results of one survey of firms, but this one has two insights to add 
to the debate about the changing nature of the European workforce.
First, the worst fears about outsourcing as a result of globalisation 
and technological change leading to reduced aggregate demand 
for human employees across Europe might be misplaced – at least 
so far. The survey suggests that just as many firms are increasing 
the number of employees that they employ due to taking work back 
in-house and new technology as are reducing numbers due to 
outsourcing and technological innovation.
Second, however, there is some support for the idea that globalisation 
and technological innovation are causing a polarisation of the 
workforce. Although the survey does not allow an assessment of 
polarisation as it is usually conceived – the growth of high- and 
low-skilled jobs at the expense of mid-skilled ones – it does reveal 
polarisation in skills use by industry. The workforces of some 
industries are becoming ever-more skilled, while another group of 
industries, in particular hospitality and leisure and retailing, appear 
to have settled for a low-skill equilibrium. While policymakers are 
right to seek to ensure that there is an adequate supply of skilled 
workers for the first group of industries, if they are concerned about 
increasing productivity and real wage growth across the whole of their 
economies, and so preventing increased income inequality, they also 
need to devote more of their efforts to finding ways of helping and 
encouraging firms in the low-skill sectors to raise their game.

POSITIVE IDEAS 
for CHANGE
The industrial structure of European economies 
and the types of work that they support are 
changing. This change takes different forms in 
different countries but there are some common 
themes across the continent.
Some of the changes are cyclical, the result of 
recession followed by a stuttering recovery. But 
other changes are the result of major structural 
forces operating in the global economy: the rapid 
pace of technological innovation, globalisation 
and demographic change. 
The purpose of this collection of essays is to 
highlight the most likely trends in employment 
across Europe over the next 10 years, and to find 
out how experts think policymakers, firms and 
individuals should respond. 
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‘Even at its most benign, technology is disruptive: whole categories of 
work become redundant; there are winners and losers; fortunes are made 
and lost; politics and power structures change; and deep, long-lasting 
social changes are set in motion.’
Diane Coyle
